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Data provenance, which describes how data is accessed and used since the time
it is created, is a valuable resource with a wide range of uses. It can be used
simply to know who has accessed one’s data, or be used in more complex sce-
narios such as detecting malware. One method for collecting data provenance is
to observe system calls. This thesis presents Progger 3, a system that observes
system calls on Linux in order to collect data provenance. There are several
existing provenance systems that observe system calls, but they have limita-
tions regarding security, efficiency, and usability. Progger 3 remedies many
of these limitations. As a result, Progger 3 is a working implementation of a
provenance system that can observe any system call, guarantee tamper-proof
provenance collection as long as the kernel on the client is not compromised,
and transfer the provenance to other systems with confidentiality and integrity,
all with a relatively low performance overhead.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For a set of data, its provenance is the metadata that is required to answer
certain questions about the history of that set of data [1]. These questions may
include: “Where did this set of data originate?”, “What transformations has
this set of data undergone over time?”, “Who has used this set of data?”, and
“How was this set of data obtained?” [1]. This thesis uses “provenance” on its
own to mean “data provenance”. No other types of provenance are discussed.
Provenance is a powerful tool that has the potential to solve many prob-
lems. For example, in an experiment it can provide a link between final results
and initial parameters, even when the data passes through many complex
stages [1], aiding in scientific reproducibility. Furthermore, if one separates re-
sults into expected and unexpected, comparing the differences in provenance
between the two groups can be used to help identify the cause of the unex-
pected results [1]. This is especially useful for software debugging, and also
allows retroactive debugging. To give a final example: provenance can as-
sist with system intrusion detection, by monitoring for abnormalities in the
provenance that is being generated.
The exact metadata constituting provenance is not fixed. Instead, there
are multiple approaches to collecting provenance. One might choose to trace
C library calls an application makes, for example, or instead choose to trace
system calls. The approach of tracing system calls to collect provenance is
3
what the focus of this thesis is.
To give a more concrete example of tracing system calls to collect prove-
nance, consider the provenance consisting of records of all open , openat , and
openat2 system calls executed by Linux on a given system. These records
could contain the system call arguments, such as file paths, the time the sys-
tem call occurred, the user making the system call, as well as whether the
operation was successful. This provenance, in particular, could be useful for
monitoring system intrusion.
Provenance is collected by provenance systems. This thesis presents Prog-
ger 3: a low-overhead, tamper-proof provenance system. Progger 3 traces
Linux system calls in order to collect provenance. As its name suggests, there
have been two earlier iterations of Progger on Linux.
The first iteration was Progger 1. Progger 1’s name is really just “Prog-
ger”, but we have retroactively named it Progger 1 to distinguish it from later
iterations. Progger 1 was created by Ryan K. L. Ko and Mark A. Will [2].
The second iteration, Progger 2 was developed at the University of Waikato,
but has not seen a public release. It began to use tracepoints to observe system
calls, rather than rewriting the addresses of system call functions as done by
Progger 1.
Given these two iterations, there were still problems that could be re-
solved. Primarily: performance. When using Progger 1 or Progger 2, our tests
showed a considerable reduction in system performance. Additionally, Prog-
ger 2 showed instability in our tests, causing user space programs to experience
segmentation faults, and causing system crashes. Both Progger 1 and Prog-
ger 2 have only a limited set of system calls that can be traced. Also, they have
user space components or bugs that mean they are not kernel-only provenance
systems, and hence prone to a malicious user space tampering with provenance
collection to some extent. Neither offers confidentiality and complete integrity
of data as it is transferred over the network. There is a proposed framework
for Progger 1 that provides this transit confidentiality and integrity [3], but
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it requires an existing provenance client implementation, and it is also only
intended for a few specific use cases.
Progger 3 was created to remedy these issues. Progger 3 was designed to be
truly kernel-only so that a malicious user space cannot tamper with the prove-
nance at any stage. Progger 3 combines its kernel-only mode with a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM), which allows it to extend the tamper-proof property
to the provenance as it is sent over the network to a remote server. This is be-
cause combining a TPM with the kernel-only mode secures a cryptographic key
from user space. This has two effects. First, the provenance can be transferred
over the network encrypted, providing confidentiality and integrity, meaning
attackers on the network path cannot tamper with or read the provenance.
Secondly, as user space can never access the cryptographic keys, it cannot
generate false provenance records. Furthermore, Progger 3 was designed with
efficiency as a primary objective, and as such is realistically usable with many
workloads without causing an unacceptable drop in performance. It also has
the ability to trace any system call, greatly enriching the provenance that can
be collected. We believe that Progger 3 is the first iteration of Progger that
can realistically be used under a wide range of workloads.
1.1 Design goals of Progger 3
The following are the design goals of Progger 3. They are presented early, as
later sections will be clearer with these in mind. It is very important to keep
in mind that Progger 3 is designed to prevent an untrusted user space from
being able to maliciously impact Progger 3’s operation (in kernel space), as
some design decisions might seem counterproductive otherwise.
A The provenance system is kernel-only, meaning that user space cannot
alter the provenance system client’s code, configuration (except during
compilation), or any data generated by the provenance system client,
both at rest and at runtime.
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B User space is never able to generate false provenance that would go un-
detected when received by the server.
C The provenance has confidentiality in transit.
D The provenance has integrity in transit.
E Collecting and transferring the provenance has a minimal performance
impact.
F Any system call can be traced.
G Provenance collection can begin before user space starts.
H The provenance system cannot be unloaded once loaded.
I The provenance system is stable; that is, crashes are rare.
J Existing APIs are used to trace system calls.
1.2 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 briefly explores some concepts that are fundamental to the under-
standing of later chapters. Chapter 3 investigates some existing provenance
systems and distinguishes them from Progger 3. Chapter 4 details the archi-
tecture of Progger 3 and explains how the architecture allowed Progger 3’s
design goals to be achieved. Chapter 5 proves the correctness of Progger 3’s
TPM usage. Chapter 6 evaluates the performance of Progger 3, as well as
some other relevant provenance systems. Chapter 7 discusses several aspects
of Progger 3, such as future work and similarities with other research. Chap-
ter 8 summarises the thesis. Finally, in Appendix A, the source code of the
implementation of Progger 3 can be found.
Chapter 2
Background
To aid with understanding the later chapters, this chapter will discuss some key
background topics relating to Progger 3. These topics are: system calls, kernel
space and user space, TPMs, trusted kernels, and XChaCha20-Poly1305.
2.1 System calls
System calls are functions that an operating system kernel provides so that
user space can request that the kernel perform certain operations. These exist
because the kernel is in charge of managing many aspects of the system, such
as file systems in many cases, so user space has to make requests to the kernel if
it wants to use the file systems. For example, Linux provides system calls such
as open to open a file on a file system, given a file path, and read / write to
modify that file.
The use of system calls in Linux is particularly relevant, as Progger 3 is a
Linux kernel module. There are over 300 system calls for x86-64, as of Linux
5.8 [4]. These range from performing file accesses, to creating new processes,
to networking [4].
Given how extensively system calls are required on Linux for accessing and
modifying data, observing the system calls and their arguments provides an
avenue for data provenance collection with high levels of comprehensiveness.
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2.2 Kernel space and user space
When code executes on a system, it is generally in either kernel space or user
space. As the names suggest, kernel space is where code from the operating
system kernel executes, and user space is where code run by the users of the
system executes. These two spaces are isolated from each other, as kernel
space code has higher privileges than user space. This isolation is achieved
through several measures, such as having separate address spaces, so user
space cannot access the memory of kernel space. That is, unless the kernel
opts to offer this access to user space. This isolation is an important security
measure, as it means that errant user space programs cannot crash the whole
system by overwriting important structures in kernel memory. By making sure
the kernel doesn’t provide user space with any access that would subvert this
separation, it is possible to consider the code running in kernel space trusted
while considering the code in user space untrusted. This idea of a trusted
kernel and untrusted user space is fundamental to Progger 3.
2.3 TPMs
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is “a system component that has state
that is separate from the system on which it reports” [5]. In more concrete
terms, it is a device that provides cryptographic services to a system, such as
storing the state of the system as SHA256 hashes and encrypting data. Such
a device is generally useful when one has some level of distrust in the code
running on the system. This is because, by the TPM storing the state of the
system as a cryptographically secure hash, it is possible to determine if the
system is in a state that is considered good, and take actions dependent on
that. For example, as a system boots, it can verify each successive component
in the boot sequence, and represent this as a hash stored in one of the many
platform configuration registers (PCRs). Then, one can inspect these PCRs
to determine whether the system has booted using only trusted components.
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TPMs have a wide range of uses, and as such are quite complex. In terms
of understanding their use with Progger 3, it is generally enough to know that
TPMs can reflect system state, as previously described, and seal data so that
the TPM must be used to decrypt it. Furthermore, the TPM can enforce that
decryption is only allowed when a PCR equals a particular value. This is the
mechanism that Progger 3 will use to secure cryptographic keys. An overview
of the components in a TPM can be seen in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: TPM architecture overview [5]
2.4 Trusted kernels
There are many ways to achieve trust in the kernel on a running system. A
comprehensive explanation of how to achieve this trust is outside the scope of
Progger 3, but an overview is still relevant.
The first requirement to achieve trust in the kernel is that each component
in the boot process must verify the next. For a typical x86-64 system, starting
from the reset vector, the host firmware executes, such as BIOS/UEFI/core-
boot. The host firmware will perform its tasks, then verify the bootloader,
such as GRUB, usually through checksumming, and pass control to the boot-
loader if verification succeeds. Then, the bootloader is able to verify the kernel
in a similar manner and boot it.
Perhaps the most natural question to ask, when hearing about each com-
ponent verifying the next in the boot flow, is: what verifies the host firmware?
This can be done in many ways. One approach is to use a system that supports
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Intel Boot Guard [6]. Using Boot Guard means that any firmware image not
signed by the system manufacturer will be rejected [7]. Alternatively, the host
firmware could write-protect the flash chip it resides upon, enforcing it either
through the platform controller hub [8] or the flash chip itself [9]. Flash chip
write-protection is different from verifying the host firmware signature at each
boot; rather, it ensures that the host firmware cannot be modified through
software. Only users with physical access to the system and the appropriate
hardware to write to the flash chips can modify the firmware. This approach is
preferable to some, as it means the owner has more control over their system.
Secondly, Linux must boot with lockdown=confidentiality set in the
kernel command line. For the lockdown parameter, specifying integrity
prevents user space from being able to alter the running kernel. Specifying
confidentiality maintains the restrictions from integrity while also pre-
venting user space from extracting secrets from the kernel [10].
With the above recommendations in place, the kernel can be considered
secure and trusted in case of a user space compromise. This is, of course,
barring bugs in the hardware, kernel, host firmware, and bootloader that might
allow an attacker to boot unsigned kernels, or alter the running kernel. It is
worth noting that there are other domains of execution on modern systems that
could alter the kernel at runtime. For an x86-64 system, System Management
Mode (SMM) is one such domain. Defending against attacks in these domains
is outside the scope of Progger 3, so we will leave the discussion at that.
With this knowledge, it should be possible to create a system with a trusted
kernel that can take advantage of Progger 3’s kernel-only mode.
2.5 XChaCha20-Poly1305
XChaCha20-Poly1305 is a cryptographic algorithm used in Progger 3 to pro-
vide confidentiality and integrity of provenance in transit. To understand
XChaCha20-Poly1305, this section first explores ChaCha20-Poly1305.
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ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
(AEAD) algorithm [11]. It takes as input a 256-bit key K, a 96-bit nonce n (in
the IETF specification of the algorithm), a plaintext of arbitrary length, and
additional authenticated data (AAD) of arbitrary length [11]. The algorithm
produces a ciphertext that is the same length as the plaintext, and a 128-
bit tag t that is used for authentication [11]. To be clear, the plaintext is
encrypted, but the AAD is not. When decryption occurs, the input is K, t,
n, the ciphertext, and the AAD. This produces the plaintext, but only if the
ciphertext and AAD are successfully authenticated against t [11]. This means
that a ciphertext will fail to authenticate if a different set of AAD is present,
even if that AAD is valid with some other ciphertext encrypted with K.
XChaCha20-Poly1305 is essentially the same algorithm as ChaCha20-Poly1305,
but the nonce is 192-bits in XChaCha20-Poly1305 [12]. The larger nonce is
the reason that Progger 3 uses XChaCha20-Poly1305, and the reason that the
larger nonce is needed is discussed in subsection 4.5.3.
Chapter 3
Existing Provenance Systems
A large number of provenance systems exist today. Pérez et al. have re-
cently systematically reviewed provenance systems and identified 251 prove-
nance systems in total [13]. Provenance systems have a wide range of scope,
from database provenance, to specific scientific workflows, to operating sys-
tem events [1]. Progger 3 is based on operating system events, system calls
in particular. So, to keep the overview of provenance systems in this chap-
ter relevant, this chapter only covers provenance systems that trace operating
system events.
Provenance systems that are based on operating system events are impor-
tant for several reasons. Their use means that user space programs do not
have to be modified for collection of provenance and provides a wide overview
of activity on a system. It is also possible for a trust boundary between the
operating system kernel and user space can be established, as described in
section 2.4. With a provenance system operating in kernel space, collecting
data based on operating system events, one can have high assurances that the
provenance collected is accurate (in particular, has not been falsified).
This chapter explores existing provenance systems, and briefly analyses
how they differ from Progger 3. The exploration focuses mostly on the limi-
tations of these provenance systems; however, this is because we wish to show
where Progger 3 has made improvements. These systems certainly have their
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own merits, but it is not always as relevant to detail them here. The improve-
ments Progger 3 has made over some of these existing provenance systems are
described in more detail throughout chapter 4.
At the end of this chapter, Table 3.1 summarises the existing provenance
systems explored in this chapter in terms of Progger 3’s design goals.
3.1 Progger 1
The first provenance system this chapter will look at is Progger 1. As previ-
ously mentioned, Progger 1 was created by Ryan K. L. Ko and Mark A. Will
[2].
Progger 1 collects provenance by monitoring a predefined set of system
calls, including, but not limited to, open , read , write , sendmsg . The log
format varies depending on the particular system call. The exact formats can
be found in [2], but it largely consists of the system call arguments, as well as
the user and process IDs associated with the current running task. The log
format is text-based, which leads to a slight decrease in the efficiency of data
transfer compared to a binary format. These logs are written to the kernel log
buffer with printk , and rsyslog takes care of transferring the logs to remote
systems.
In order to observe the system calls, Progger 1 rewrites the address of the
system call functions to ones defined by Progger 1, which wrap the original
system calls. This is not ideal, as the system call table is marked read-only,
and hardware write protection (bit 16 of register CR0) is temporarily disabled
for a short time to rewrite the function addresses. This gives a small window
of time where read-only data may be updated, whether maliciously or not,
which could harm the system.
One of Progger 1’s significant breakthroughs was providing a level of tamper-
evident logging, so that falsified provenance could be detected in many (but not
all) cases [2]. While the provenance collected by Progger 1 has some integrity,
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there is no confidentiality when it is in transit [2].
Being a nascent development, Progger 1 had not been optimised much for
performance, so it can increase the execution time of the open system call by
up to 21,000% [2].
One notable issue is that Progger 1 is available only as a standalone module:
there is no option for it to be built into the kernel. So, there will be a gap
where provenance is not collected before user space loads the module.
3.1.1 Kernel-only implementation in Progger 1
This section will see how Progger 1 fares in terms of Progger 3’s design goal A.
Progger 1 is a standalone Linux kernel module, but there are some aspects that
are dependent on user space programs. One such program is rsyslog , used for
transferring collected provenance [2]. There are two classes of issue here: the
availability of the provenance, and the tamper-resistance of the provenance.
Some issues are:
1. The rsyslog process could be killed or stopped, preventing the prove-
nance from being logged.
2. A compromised root user could alter rsyslog so that it doesn’t transfer
certain provenance records, or adds false provenance records.
3. An arbitrary kernel module could generate false provenance records.
These issues are similar to, or were exactly specified, in [2]. The recom-
mended approach in [2] places trust in the rsyslog process by passing the
process ID of rsyslog to the kernel module as it is inserted. Unfortunately,
this means that, if rsyslog is killed, it will almost certainly respawn with a
different PID, so the provenance gathering would halt.
An approach presented by [2] to solve the issue of false records being added
was a hash-chaining approach. They came to the conclusion that such an
approach makes log tampering difficult, but not impossible [2].
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So, Progger 1 is not a kernel-only implementation, and some issues arise
as a result. Yet, Progger 1 was never developed with an entirely kernel-only
mode as an objective [2].
3.2 Progger 1 trusted framework
M. M. M. Bany Taha explored creating a trusted framework built upon Prog-
ger 1 [3]. It has some similar goals to Progger 3; namely, providing confiden-
tiality and integrity for the collected provenance. However, it goes beyond
the scope of Progger 3 to present a framework that encompasses collecting
provenance from clients, securely storing the provenance in servers, then later
archiving the provenance. This framework uses software around an existing
provenance client in order to make improvements. Progger 3, meanwhile, ad-
dresses existing shortcomings by improving the provenance client itself. Due
to this approach, some issues in Progger 1, such as efficiency, are not dealt
with by this framework.
This framework is compared with Progger 3 in more detail in subsec-
tion 7.2.1, which shows more clearly why there is still a need for Progger 3
given the existence of this extension to Progger 1.
3.3 Progger 2
Progger 2 was developed at the University of Waikato, but has not seen a pub-
lic release. It began to use tracepoints in order to observe system calls, rather
than rewriting the addresses of system call functions as done by Progger 1.
Like Progger 1, it supports only a fixed subset of the available system calls. It
opted to create a direct TCP connection to a server for sending provenance,
rather than the rsyslog -based approach in Progger 1, removing the need for
user space components during run-time. As a whole, Progger 2 was, unfortu-
nately, quite unstable in our tests, causing system crashes when used. From
the brief evaluation in chapter 6, the performance hit was too high for many
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workloads. For the provenance logged, there was no guarantee of integrity or
confidentiality. These issues can mostly be explained by the fact that Progger 2
had not finished development to at least a release-quality level.
As with Progger 1, Progger 2 is available only as a standalone kernel mod-
ule, so cannot capture provenance early in the boot process.
3.3.1 Kernel-only implementation in Progger 2
As done for Progger 1, this section evaluates how closely Progger 2 meets
Progger 3’s design goal A. Progger 2 is a standalone Linux kernel module. In
contrast to Progger 1, it doesn’t have any user space components.
There is at least one subtle but serious flaw in Progger 2: it uses sock_create
instead of sock_create_kern (which is what Progger 3 uses) to create the
socket used for sending the provenance over TCP. Following the code in Linux,
one arrives at the code found in Listing 3.1.
Listing 3.1: Linux’s inet6 create function
1 static int inet6_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
2 int protocol, int kern)
3 {
4 [...]
5 if (!kern) {
6 err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk);








This means that, as the socket is being created, an eBPF program of the
type BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK can be run. This eBPF program, created
by user space, can determine whether to allow or block the creation of the
socket [14]. The code example above is specifically for an IPv6 socket, but this
holds true for IPv4 sockets too. Hence, user space is able to block Progger 2
from starting. Of course, it would be simple to replace the call to sock_create
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with sock_create_kern , but this does highlight how easy it is to make subtle
mistakes.
Although not strictly related to being kernel-only, it is an opportune mo-
ment to point out that, since Progger 2 does not authenticate what it sends, a
malicious user space process could start generating false provenance. It could
be possible to detect this: consider receiving two streams of provenance at
once. However, combined with user space’s ability to deny Progger 2 from
starting, a malicious process could quite realistically masquerade as the legit-
imate Progger 2 process.
So, Progger 2 strived to be a kernel-only implementation, but there are,
unfortunately, some issues that stop it from getting there completely.
3.4 PASS
PASS [15] is a provenance system with a slightly larger scope than Progger 3:
it seeks to collect provenance through observing system calls, managing the
storage of the provenance, and allow queries to be performed on the provenance
[15, 16]. For storage, local file systems, network file systems, or cloud storage
can all be used [16].
PASS is a Linux kernel module, but to our knowledge has not described
steps to ensure that user space is unable to impact the operation of PASS
maliciously. Indeed, if transferring the provenance to the cloud, it is described
that a file system in user space (FUSE), named PA-S3fs, is used [16]. Fur-
ther, the authors of PASS state that work on provenance tamper-proofing is
complimentary to their work [16].
Additionally, although it is up to the user of PASS to configure their remote
file systems and cloud storage correctly, it would be possible to ensure the




CamFlow [17] is a provenance system that has both user space and kernel
space components. Some of its authors were involved in the development of
PASS [17].
In kernel space, CamFlow has a Linux Security Module (LSM), as opposed
to a traditional Linux kernel module like each Progger iteration. An LSM is
able to provide code to run at specific security-critical points in the kernel [18].
The potential advantages of an LSM-based approach are briefly discussed in
subsection 7.3.9.
CamFlow doesn’t have the ability to trace only a select few system calls. In
fact, system calls are not its primary target: its LSM-based approach centres
around determining what objects are being accessed, rather than how the
objects are being accessed [17]. Still, it can collect provenance based on several
filters, such as provenance of specific files or users [17]. Whether this approach
is more useful than Progger 3’s depends on the particular user’s needs.
As CamFlow has user space components, it is not a kernel-only provenance
system. Of course, with different threat models, CamFlow’s architecture can
be perfectly suitable; but it doesn’t fill the niche that Progger 3 does.
Unfortunately, we experienced a kernel panic and a user space utility seg-
mentation fault after only a short time of testing, so stability has room for
improvement.
3.6 Sysdig
Sysdig [19] is not typically described as a provenance system, but it has the
capabilities to collect the same information from system calls as Progger 3.
It acts similarly to the Progger iterations: it has a Linux kernel module that
obtains provenance from system calls using tracepoints. It then writes that
provenance to a user space buffer, where user space utilities manage reading it.
It does not indicate a goal of tamper-proof provenance, and certainly, by design
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does not prevent user space attacks. This is not surprising, as it presents itself
as more of a debug and system observation tool, not a security tool.
3.7 SystemTap
SystemTap [20] is very similar to Sysdig. All the information given in the
above section about Sysdig applies to SystemTap, except that SystemTap
uses kprobes as well as tracepoints. The main difference is in their features,
implementation, and performance. What is relevant here is their difference in
performance, with chapter 6 showing that SystemTap performs better gener-
ally.
3.8 bpftrace
bpftrace [21] is again not typically described as a provenance system, but can
be used as one, much like Sysdig and SystemTap. The main difference from
the other provenance systems explored in this chapter is that bpftrace uses
eBPF. (Sysdig can use eBPF, but its support is not entirely stable.) eBPF is a
way of running sandboxed programs within the Linux kernel, allowing access
to kernel programming interfaces while minimising the risk of errant programs
damaging the kernel [22]. With eBPF, both tracepoints, kprobes, and more
can be used to observe system calls. bpftrace makes it easy to compile an eBPF
program and get the program’s output into user space. The eBPF programs
are loaded into the kernel from user space, so naturally the provenance is not
protected from user space attacks. Again, this is not a security tool so much
as it is a debugging tool that happens to be able to function as a provenance
system.
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3.9 Comparison to Progger 3
The design goals of Progger 3 are listed in section 1.1. As this thesis will later
show, they have all been met.
Table 3.1 shows how the provenance systems from this chapter fare in terms
of Progger 3’s design goals. None of the other provenance systems comes close
to meeting all of the design goals for Progger 3, and the difference is rather
marked when comparing Progger 3 to Progger 1 and Progger 2. As such, we
believe that the development of Progger 3 is justified and a useful contribution.
Progger 3 was tested on only two systems during development: one bare-
metal system, and one virtual machine. This may mask stability issues with
Progger 3, as any issues arising from system-specific quirks would have been
fixed during development. It is possible that, on a different system, Progger 3
could exhibit reduced stability. Still, the experience of developing Progger 3 did
not suggest much room for system-specific quirks to lead to reduced stability.
Hence, it is likely that Progger 3 is widely stable.
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Design goal of Progger 3 (as given in section 1.1)
A B C D E F G H I J
Progger 1 × partial × partial × × × × a ? ×
Progger 2 × × × × × × × × × X
Progger 3 X X X X X X X X X X
PASS × × X X borderline [15] ? X ? ? ?
CamFlow × × N/A N/A borderline [17] N/A X × b × X
Sysdig × × N/A N/A borderline X × × X X
SystemTap × × N/A N/A X X × × X X
bpftrace × × N/A N/A borderline X × × X X
Table 3.1: Comparison of Progger 3’s design goals with other provenance sys-
tems, to the best of our understanding
aThe code indicates an attempt at preventing module unloading, but doing so hangs the
system.
bThe LSM component cannot be removed, but the user space components can be in-
structed to stop provenance collection.
Chapter 4
The Architecture of Progger 3
Section 1.1 presents the design goals of Progger 3. Progger 3 has achieved
all of its design goals, and this chapter will describe how the architecture of
Progger 3 lends itself to achieving those goals. These goals can be roughly
grouped into the following:
Efficiency. Progger 3 has been designed with efficiency as a primary objec-
tive. As can be seen in chapter 6, provenance systems such as Progger 1 and
Progger 2 have so much overhead that they reduce performance to levels that
may not be realistically usable. Progger 3 has remedied this, and is efficient
enough to be used in many real workloads.
Security. By using a TPM, as well as ensuring a true kernel-only mode of
operation exists, Progger 3 can essentially guarantee tamper-proof provenance
collection, even as the provenance is transferred over the network to a remote
server (assuming the kernel is not compromised).
Usability. Progger 3 allows one to easily select which system calls to mon-
itor, and supports tracing any system call. With Progger 1 and Progger 2,
the selection of system calls being monitored is fixed, and only a relatively
small subset of all system calls are supported. Additionally, Progger 3 is very
stable, meaning that it can be deployed with confidence and relied upon to
continuously collect provenance without crashing.
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4.1 Chapter outline
Section 4.2 gives an overview of Progger 3, exploring what Progger 3 is capable
of and how it can be configured. Section 4.3 details the data format that the
Progger 3 client uses to send records of system calls to a server. Section 4.4
describes how Progger 3 ensures a kernel-only mode of operation to guard
against malicious user space activity. Section 4.5 discusses the cryptography
used in Progger 3 to ensure the provenance’s confidentiality and integrity. Sec-
tion 4.6 explores the way in which Progger 3 utilises a TPM to fully achieve
its cryptography and kernel-only design goals. Section 4.7 lists the steps taken
to achieve performance improvements. Section 4.8 describes how Progger 3 is
able to trace any system call without needing individual functions to support
each specific system call. Section 4.9 covers the level of stability shown by
Progger 3. That is, how much one can rely on Progger 3 to operate without
errors or crashes. Section 4.10 discusses how the design of Progger 3 allows for
easy maintenance and easy modification of features. Finally, section 4.11 sum-
marises Progger 3’s architecture and what Progger 3 has achieved by meeting
its design goals.
4.2 An overview of Progger 3
Progger 3 is a Linux kernel module that collects data provenance through
monitoring system calls. It uses tracepoints 1, an API of Linux allowing code to
execute on entry and exit of certain functions, in order to log information about
each system call. Progger 3 can be configured easily through Linux’s kbuild
system, by running make menuconfig or any other configuration interface, an
experience that will be familiar to many who have compiled Linux before. The
configuration interface is presented in Figure 4.1, and the tracepoint sub-menu,
which allows one to provide a regular expression to select which system calls
are traced, is presented in Figure 4.2. Any system call can be traced.
1This achieves design goal J
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Figure 4.1: Progger 3 configuration with make nconfig
Values such as the system calls to trace and destination IP address have
to be set at compile time, and cannot be changed during run time. This is
because Progger 3 is designed so that user space cannot maliciously impact the
operation of Progger 3, say by setting the list of traced system calls to be empty,
or sending the (encrypted) provenance records to a different destination. This
partially achieves design goal A.
Every time a system call that Progger 3 has been instructed to trace oc-
curs, a provenance record is generated. There is currently no configuration to
generate records for only a subset of the system calls that have been selected
to be traced. For example, it is not possible to trace system calls made by only
a specific process. As just mentioned, configuration must be made at compile
time, not run time, and it is highly impractical to predetermine the PID of a
particular process, except the init process. A process is able to change its own
comm value, so that is not reliable either. Of course, process filtering can be
done later by a program that processes the data collected by Progger 3.
While there are some limitations with flexibility, as just described, these
limitations do exist for security purposes. In determining whether to use Prog-
ger 3, one should assess whether Progger 3’s security advantages are beneficial
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Figure 4.2: Progger 3 configuration: tracepoints sub-menu
under their threat model, and weigh those advantages up against Progger 3’s
more limited flexibility compared to other provenance systems.
When it comes to transferring the collected provenance, Progger 3 sends
the data it collects over TCP to a server, which runs in user space. The
server can be running on the same host as the Progger 3 client (for testing and
debugging), or on a physically separate host that is reachable over the network.
The remote server, collecting provenance from potentially multiple Progger 3
clients, is assumed to have a trusted user space. The implementation of the
server can vary, but we have created an implementation that takes the data it
receives and prints it as JSON. The next sections will define the record format
Progger 3 uses to send data over the network, and then show the server’s JSON
output.
4.3 Record format
Each message Progger 3 sends across the network contains a set of records that
are encrypted and authenticated by XChaCha20-Poly1305. A record is com-
posed of two parts: a header and a body. The header allows for multiple record
types in the future, but currently there is only one: RECORD_SYSCALL_X86_64 .
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4.3.1 Header format
0 1 2 3




| ID | reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4.3: The record header format
The record header format is set out in Figure 4.3. Its fields have the
following meanings:
• length — The length in bytes of the whole record, including the header.
A 4-octet field.
• ID — The ID of the record. A 2-octet field.
• reserved — A reserved value to ensure the data following the header has
a 4-octet alignment for performance. A 2-octet field.
4.3.2 Body format
Due to the record header just described, record types other than an x86-
64 system call record can be easily added in the future. However, currently
that is the only record that exists. Its record ID is RECORD_SYSCALL_X86_64 .
The format is set out in Figure 4.4. Each record represents one system call
occurrence. Its fields have the following meanings:
• tracepoint src — The tracepoint that is the source of the data. MUST be
either TP_SRC_SYS_ENTER (2) or TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT (4). Naturally, these
values respectively refer to the sys_enter and sys_exit tracepoints.
A 1-octet field.
• reserved — A reserved value so that successive fields have a 4-octet
alignment. A 1-octet field.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+







+ system call return value +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| process ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| user ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| effective user ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
























+ system call string arguments +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4.4: The RECORD SYSCALL X86 64 format
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• system call number — The system call number, as given by Linux. A
2-octet field.
• timestamp — A timestamp representing the number of nanoseconds since
the system booted. Some other time formats, such as the real value of the
system clock, could be more desirable in some cases. However, the system
clock can be modified by user space, so it is not suitable. Furthermore,
the timestamp should be monotonic, which is not guaranteed of the
system clock. A 4-octet field.
• system call return value — The return value of the system call, if the
tracepoint source is TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT . 0 otherwise. A 4-octet field.
• process ID — The process ID of the process that made the system call,
as seen from the initial PID namespace. A 4-octet field.
• user ID — The real user ID of the process that made the system call, as
seen from the initial user namespace. A 4-octet field.
• effective user ID — The effective user ID of the process that made the
system call, as seen from the initial user namespace. A 4-octet field.
• system call argument 0..5 — The arguments to the system call. If, for
some n, the system call doesn’t use argument n, the system call argument
n field is undefined and should be ignored. Each is a 4-octet field.
• system call string arguments — If a system call takes a C-string for
an argument, its value will appear here. The strings are concatenated
from argument 0 to argument 5. Each string is limited to 4096 octets,
including the NUL byte. Linux defines the maximum length of a file
path to be 4096 bytes, also including the NUL byte, so string truncation
should not lose any meaningful information. A variable-length field, up
to 24576 octets.
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A notable omission is that this record does not contain the contents pointed
to by pointer arguments, other than C-strings. The approach taken by Prog-
ger 3, where only integer arguments and C-strings are copied, seeks to minimise
complexity and maximise efficiency while still providing the most useful infor-
mation for many use cases. Pointer arguments can point to complex struct s,
which would take a lot of care to serialise and deserialise, increasing the risk
for error. Errors are crucial to avoid in kernel code, as an error can lead to a
system crash, or compromise at a very high privilege level.
4.3.3 Server JSON output
Listing 4.1 provides a sample of the output of our Progger 3 server implemen-
tation when the system calls openat , setuid , setreuid , and setresuid are
being monitored. Refer to section 4.3 for more detail.
Listing 4.1: Progger 3 server output
1 { "id": "openat", "tp_src": "sys_exit", "ts": 8901772142832, "ret":
6, "pid": 12300, "uid": 0, "euid": 0, "args": [ 4294967196,
140735053210000, 591872, 0, 140735053211440, 32 ], "strings": [
"\/etc\/gss\/mech.d" ] }
2 { "id": "setresuid", "tp_src": "sys_exit", "ts": 8901772503698,
"ret": 0, "pid": 12300, "uid": 105, "euid": 105, "args": [ 105,
105, 105, 7, 94176267341920, 94176267341824 ], "strings": [ ] }
3 { "id": "setuid", "tp_src": "sys_exit", "ts": 8901772511526, "ret":
-1, "pid": 12300, "uid": 105, "euid": 105, "args": [ 0, 0, -1,
7, 94176267341920, 94176267341824 ], "strings": [ ] }
4 { "id": "setresuid", "tp_src": "sys_exit", "ts": 8901772513575,
"ret": -1, "pid": 12300, "uid": 105, "euid": 105, "args": [ -1,
0, -1, 7, 94176267341920, 94176267341824 ], "strings": [ ] }
5 { "id": "openat", "tp_src": "sys_exit", "ts": 8901826793176, "ret":
27, "pid": 217, "uid": 0, "euid": 0, "args": [ 4294967196,
140736600249456, 524288, 0, 0, 1 ], "strings": [
"\/proc\/12299\/comm" ] }
6 { "id": "openat", "tp_src": "sys_exit", "ts": 8901827120638, "ret":
-2, "pid": 217, "uid": 0, "euid": 0, "args": [ 4294967196,




The Progger 3 client operates in kernel-only mode, which means that there are
no user space components in the client, and that user space cannot alter the
code of the client or any data produced by the client. Additionally, operating
entirely in kernel mode means that data doesn’t have to be copied between
user space and kernel space, leading to efficiency gains. The following sections
explore how Progger 3 achieves its kernel-only mode of operation; that is,
achieves design goal A.
4.4.1 Trusted kernels
Having the Progger 3 client run entirely as a kernel module is necessary for
a kernel-only mode of operation (design goal A), but it is not sufficient. To
ensure kernel-only operation, the user must verify that the kernel itself cannot
be tampered with; that is, that the kernel can be trusted. Achieving a trusted
kernel is outlined in section 2.4. Since Progger 3 has a secret key in kernel mem-
ory, the user must boot with the kernel argument lockdown=confidentiality ,
as mentioned in section 2.4. Now, the kernel has dominion over user space, and
user space is no longer able to modify the trusted kernel, assuming no bugs
compromise this separation. Yet, these steps are still not entirely sufficient
to achieve design goal A. The final steps taken to achieve design goal A of
Progger 3 are listed shortly in subsection 4.4.2.
To see why the measures given so far are necessary, consider a clean in-
stallation of Debian 10 GNU/Linux running without lockdown set. Any root
user is able to insert arbitrary kernel modules, one of which may probe for
Progger 3’s secret key, or try to stop the two tasks Progger 3 runs (tasks are
essentially processes). A root user could also use kexec to load a new kernel
with an altered or absent Progger 3. Furthermore, if the /dev/kmem interface
is available, one might have a chance of recovering Progger 3’s secret key by
reading from that interface, These attacks are all negated by booting with
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lockdown=confidentiality [10].
However, using a trusted kernel can be a hindrance to the operation of
some systems. For example, a user may be an administrator of their own
personal computing device and want to be able to easily modify the kernel.
For this user, the traditional trust boundary between regular users and root
users may provide sufficient security. Progger 3 can still be used in this case,
without any modification, so it not a requirement that users implement a
trusted kernel if they decide it is unnecessary for their threat model. Of course,
the tamper-resistance is lower in that case, as a compromised user space could,
potentially, read kernel memory to find the encryption/authentication key, and
then produce false records.
In contrast, some example deployments where these trusted-kernel require-
ments may be easier to satisfy are virtual machine deployments, and organi-
sations issuing many devices to its members through an IT department. So,
while the use of Progger 3’s kernel-only mode with a trusted kernel is not fea-
sible in every system, there are certainly areas where it can be used, and these
areas are quite significant ones.
4.4.2 Kernel-only implementation in Progger 3
The Progger 3 client has no user space components. It can be compiled as
a standalone kernel module, or a be compiled built-in to the kernel. The
standalone module is intended for development and debugging, as it must be
loaded by user space. Being loaded by user space, there will be a duration be-
fore the module is loaded where provenance is not collected, which is sufficient
to disqualify the module from being able to collect provenance of all activity
on a system. Being built-in to the kernel, which is a new feature of version 3
of Progger, means that every system call made can be logged, achieving de-
sign goal G. Furthermore, the built-in approach means that there is no risk
that user space might be able to remove Progger 3 at run time. (Standalone
modules can try to prevent user space from unloading them, but it is nice not
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to have this risk at all by being built-in.) Hence, design goal H is achieved.
In addition to having no user space components, we spent time trying to
ensure that there were no bugs in Progger 3’s kernel code that could let user
space programs influence Progger 3 in some undue way. An example of such
an issue in Progger 2 is described in subsection 3.3.1.
Unfortunately, there are two issues related to user space being able to
maliciously affect the availability of the data generated by Progger 3. These are
listed in subsection 7.3.2 and subsection 7.3.3 These issues stem from the fact
that a root user has some influence over task priority and network interfaces.
To the best of our knowledge, fixing these issues would require quite invasive
changes to Linux, and is far outside the scope of Progger 3.
Still, given the measures in place, user space is unable to modify the code
of the Progger 3 client or any data produced by the Progger 3 client. As
discussed earlier, in section 4.2, user space cannot change the configuration of
Progger 3. So, design goal A is met.
That this kernel-only mode provides protection of Progger 3’s data from
user space is essential for Progger 3’s use of a TPM, as will soon be described.
The TPM is used to seal a cryptographic key, and when that key is loaded
into Progger 3, the kernel-only mode means that user space cannot access the
key.
4.4.3 Conclusion
Progger 3 has a true kernel-only mode, while Progger 1 and Progger 2 do not,
as described in chapter 3. This means that only Progger 3, being built-in to
the kernel, can ensure comprehensive logging of provenance, from the moment
user space starts. It further means that Progger 3 cannot have its code or
data altered by user space. Having a true kernel-only mode paves the way for
Progger 3’s enhanced tamper-resistance relative to its predecessors through
the use of a TPM, which is detailed shortly.
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4.5 Cryptography
Progger 3 is the first implementation of Progger to provide strong cryptography
to ensure that the collected provenance is confidential and cannot be tampered
with in-flight, and to allow the receiver to verify the provenance truly came
from the expected provenance client.
In contrast, Progger 2 does not provide any assurances of confidentiality
or integrity: data is sent in plaintext and unauthenticated.
With Progger 1, there is a proposed framework that provides confidential-
ity and integrity [3]. This framework is discussed in detail in subsection 7.2.1.
What is relevant here is that this framework describes how to combine an ex-
isting provenance client with other software and a TPM in order to achieve
confidentiality and integrity. Meanwhile, Progger 3 makes these improvements
in the provenance client itself. When looking at Progger 1 by itself, as described
in [2], the provenance records contain hashes based upon the last provenance
record of the same system call. This is useful for detecting whether a malicious
entry may have been added locally, but does not allow a receiver to authen-
ticate that the provenance as a whole has not been tampered with in-flight.
Consider, for example, an attacker in the network path that can intercept
and modify every message sent by Progger 1. This attacker could modify
all of the hashes so their alterations to the provenance would go undetected.
Furthermore, there is no confidentiality. This may be because the envisioned
usage of Progger 1 is within a cloud environment, where the network paths
from systems running the Progger client to a server collecting the data are
trusted. However, Progger 3’s approach means that it can be used in many
more scenarios, not just environments with trusted networks. It also means
that tampering with the provenance is essentially impossible, assuming trust
in the kernel, as opposed to being only “very difficult” in Progger 1 [2].
The following sections explain why confidentiality and integrity are essen-
tial. Then, the sections after that cover the measures implemented in Progger 3
to achieve confidentiality and integrity.
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4.5.1 Confidentiality
Progger 3 can be configured to collect very detailed information about a sys-
tem. This information can include the file names on a system, the time of
each file access, as well as the programs being executed. So, by having access
to the information generated by such a configuration of Progger 3, one could
readily determine, in real-time or retroactively, what activities are, or might
be taking place, on the system.
4.5.2 Integrity
An attacker in the network path between the Progger 3 client and server is able
to modify any packet it forwards. Without any action to prevent it, this could
give an attacker the ability to spoof packets, asserting that a phony action
occurred; to modify packet contents, potentially hiding activity; or to drop
packets entirely without the server knowing, again masking activity. Since
there must be a high level of confidence in the collected provenance, such
attacks must be thwarted.
4.5.3 Cryptography approach in Progger 3
In Progger 3, both confidentiality and integrity can be assured. In kernel mode,
a complete TLS implementation is not available 2. Such an implementation
would be a serious undertaking, and likely add significant complexity and
attack surface to the kernel [24]. Instead, Progger 3 uses a simpler approach
based on XChaCha20-Poly1305.
When a message is to be sent over the network, it is encrypted and authen-
ticated with XChaCha20-Poly1305. This process also binds some plaintext,
known as the associated data, to the cipher text. When decryption takes
place, the message and the associated data must both be untampered for ver-
2There is a feature of Linux called “kernel TLS”, but that deals with data encryption
only; the more complicated handshake is left to user space [23].
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ification to succeed. The format of this message, as it appears “on the wire”,
can be seen in Figure 4.5.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| Message length (32 bits) | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Associated
| | | data
















+ Record set encrypted by ChaCha20 (arbitrary length) +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Poly1305 tag (16 bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4.5: Format of messages sent over the network by Progger 3
The algorithm is performed by the function xchacha20poly1305_encrypt ,
which is part of the Linux kernel’s crypto library. Progger 3 does not have its
own implementation of any cryptographic algorithm; instead, it uses existing
implementations that have been reviewed by many people.
The reason that XChaCha20-Poly1305 was chosen over ChaCha20-Poly1305
is due to the longer nonce in XChaCha20-Poly1305, which offers a 192-bit
nonce as opposed to a 96-bit nonce [12]. Given that the keys used on each
system running the Progger 3 client are static, as is explained later, a sim-
ple counter nonce is unsuitable, as that would lead to reuse of {key, nonce}
when the system reboots. Such reuse is to be avoided at all costs, as it reveals
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the XOR of the plaintexts [11]. Use of a random nonce for each message is
also unsuitable, due to the overhead of repeatedly generating a random nonce.
Progger 3 opts to construct the nonce by concatenating a random value R,
generated once when Progger 3 starts, with a counter n that increments once
with each message. 96 bits is not enough to allow for a large enough R and n,
but 192 bits is. Progger 3 uses R for the first 128 bits of the nonce, and n for
the final 64 bits. This construction is not security-affecting compared to using
an entirely random nonce, or an entirely counter-based nonce [12]. With 128
bits for R, it would take 2128/2 = 264 ≈ 1.84 × 1019 reloads of Progger 3 for
there to be a 50% chance of reuse of R. Further, Progger 3 would have to send
264 messages without the system rebooting before the counter cycles, which,
at an absurd rate of 1,000,000 messages per second would take over 500,000
years. So, nonce reuse will not occur with this construction.
The associated data used in Progger 3 is simple: a 32-bit unsigned integer
indicating the length of the message, so the server receiving the message knows
when it has a complete message, and a 64-bit unsigned integer to act as a
unique client ID, as seen in Figure 4.5. Ideally, Progger 3 would not reveal the
client ID. Yet, it seems to be the best approach, given that each client should
have its own unique key used for encryption, and the server needs to be able
to determine which key to use to decrypt each message it receives.
The message length placed in the associated data, unfortunately, needs to
be used by the server before the message is authenticated, as the whole message
must be received before it can be authenticated. If a malicious actor changed
this value, it could cause Progger 3 to read too much or too little data. Upon
receipt of the incorrect amount of data, the message would not authenticate, so
it could be determined that the message was tampered with, but there would
be no way of knowing what length of data is out of sync. So, Progger 3 would
have to reinitiate the connection, losing some data in the process. However,
this requires a network carrier to perform the attack, and they could simply
drop part or all of the traffic anyway. So, effectively, there is no difference in
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security due to the fact that Progger 3 uses the length value in the associated
data before it can authenticate it. That is, as long as Progger 3 sanitises
repeated extremely large values that might cause memory exhaustion. In the
end, this in no way deals with a compromise of confidentiality or integrity.
It is also vital to avoid replay attacks and detect dropped messages. This
could be accomplished by adding a message sequence number to the authen-
ticated data. However, a message sequence number already exists: it’s the
counter in the nonce. So, if the server successfully decrypts a message, it
knows that the nonce is correct, and it can use the embedded sequence num-
ber to check if the message has been replayed, or potentially determine if a
message has been lost in transmission.
When considering confidentiality, one should consider how the message
length might reveal information about its contents. For example, if an attacker
knows that the messages being sent are records generated by Progger 3 for the
openat system call, the message length could reveal the length of the path of
the file opened, assuming the message contains only a single openat record,
and no padding is added to the message. To avoid this information leak,
Progger 3 pads its messages to a multiple of 16 bytes.
With all this considered, one can be assured that messages transferred by
Progger 3 are done so with confidentiality and integrity. This means that
design goals C and D have been met.
4.5.3.1 Private key storage
In order to utilise XChaCha20-Poly1305, Progger 3 requires a symmetric key
that both the client and receiving server know, but which is kept secret from
user space. If user space could access the key, it could forge messages. These
forged messages could potentially arrive at the receiving server before the real
messages, causing the real messages to be discarded in favour of the forged
messages. This would mean that design goal B would not be met.
So, to prevent user space from being able to access the key, the approach
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taken by Progger 3 is to use a key that is sealed by a TPM when the system
is provisioned. A TPM policy is used so that the key can only be unsealed
when a chosen PCR is in a specific state. When Progger 3 has unsealed the
key, before user space has had an opportunity to execute, the chosen PCR is
extended so that the key can never be unsealed again until the system’s power
is cycled.
The key would also be stored on the receiving server. However, it is as-
sumed that user space is trusted on the receiving server, so the key can be
stored without precautions such as the use of a TPM. As long as the disk the
key is stored on is encrypted, and the key is only readable by the appropriate
user space processes, the key on the receiving server can be considered secure.
This approach has the following disadvantages:
• A TPM is required.
• Extra work has to be done to seal the key when the system is provisioned.
• The key is also stored on the receiving server. If it is compromised from
there, a client could be impersonated.
• A key compromise is more difficult to recover from, as the replacement
key has to be re-sealed with the TPM.
Another approach that might, at first, seem a reasonable solution, is to
use an ephemeral Diffie–Hellman key exchange. But it is essential that the
receiving server can verify that it is communicating with the kernel client of a
particular system, and the ephemeral Diffie–Hellman key exchange does not,
on its own, achieve that. In order for the kernel client to authenticate itself
to the receiving server, it needs a private key that must, again, be kept secret
from user space. This ends up back at the original problem of requiring a
method to keep a persistent secret hidden from user space.
However, this does raise a question: what if Progger 3 sealed the private
key for client authentication with the TPM and used a Diffie–Hellman key
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exchange to generate the XChaCha20-Poly1305 key? In this case, the private
key couldn’t be compromised from the receiving server, as it would only store
the public part of the client key. This does offer a slight security benefit, but
the following are disadvantages:
• The Progger 3 kernel client would have to process data that it receives
from the network, increasing the kernel attack surface.
• There is no existing interface for directly performing a Diffie–Hellman
key exchange in the Linux kernel. Having to implement this would be a
considerable undertaking.
• The communication protocol between the Progger 3 kernel client and
receiving server becomes more complex. Instead of the client simply
sending a single type of message to the receiving server with no associated
state (except a sequence number), the client and receiving server have to
carefully keep track of what state they are in so that they can determine
the correct type of message to send.
As the disadvantages were deemed to outweigh the advantages, it was not
considered appropriate to utilise an ephemeral Diffie–Hellman key exchange in
the kernel client of Progger 3.
A TPM is not the only way to store a key on a system such that it is only
accessible to the kernel. This thesis focuses on the TPM approach, as that
is what Progger 3 implements, but it is worth noting that the key could, for
example, be stored on read-protected flash storage. As such, it is possible for
Progger 3 to be modified to run on systems without a TPM and still provide
its highest guarantees of tamper resistance.
4.6 Trusted platform module
As just described, Progger 3 makes use of a TPM to store the secret key used for
XChaCha20-Poly1305. The following sections explore how Progger 3 utilises
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a TPM and what requirements exist. A proof of correctness of Progger 3’s
TPM operations can be later found in chapter 5. The reader may be aware
that the usage of a TPM with Progger 1 was previously explored by M. M. M.
Bany Taha [3]. Compared to Progger 3, the reasons for TPM usage and the
way in which the TPM is used are quite different. A comparison can be found
in subsection 7.2.1.
4.6.1 TPM provisioning
When a system that is to use Progger 3 is provisioned, a symmetric key that
is unique to the system must be generated and then sealed with the TPM of
the system. Progger 3 requires that the TPM support version 2.0 of the TPM
specification [5], and version 2.0 of the TPM specification is assumed for all
the discussion here.
When a TPM seals data, the final product is an object, split into a public
and encrypted private part, that can be used in combination with the TPM
to recover the data. This object is known as a sealed data object [5]. The data
itself isn’t persistently stored in the TPM, nor are the parts of the sealed data
object. To unseal the data, the sealed data object parts must be reloaded into
the TPM, and then the TPM must be instructed to perform the unsealing.
TPM commands are very low-level, having many variables with very spe-
cific requirements. Few would construct these commands manually; instead,
software can be used to abstract them away to more simple commands. For
example, tpm2-tools[25]. There are some choices the provisioner must make
when using tpm2-tools[25]. The requirements for these choices are listed
shortly.
We have created a script, which is provided in the Progger 3 source code,
that performs the provisioning using tpm2-tools[25], meeting all of the re-
quirements listed below. It can be useful for further understanding of the
steps required. It also ensures that the symmetric key never touches the disk
of the system that is being provisioned. It may be found in section A.22.
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To begin the requirements, the parent key used for sealing the symmetric
key must:
• Be a persistent object
• Be a child of the storage root key (SRK), or be the SRK itself
• Specify strong encryption algorithms. Strong is subjective, but SHA256
and RSA2048 can be considered strong at this point in time.
Additionally, the lockdown and owner authorisation values must be set and
kept secret. The last requirement is that a policy is added to the sealed data,
so that it may only be unsealed when a chosen PCR is in a specific state, such
as its default state.
The reasons for all of these requirements are made clear in the proof of
correctness chapter.
Reprovisioning is possible by using the owner authorisation value, but care
should be taken to ensure there is no malware on the system that might be
able to intercept the authorisation or new symmetric key and use it later
maliciously.
4.6.2 TPM unsealing
Once the TPM has been provisioned, the public and private part of the sealed
data object, as well as the chosen PCR, can be provided to Progger 3 during
compilation. Then, whenever Progger 3 starts, it performs algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: tpm unseal and lock key
1 Load the sealed data object into the TPM.
2 Use the TPM to unseal the symmetric key.
3 Extend the PCR allocated to Progger 3.
4 Flush the loaded objects from the TPM.
If Progger 3 fails at any point, meaning that the PCR cannot be extended,
which would leave the key potentially available to user space, a kernel panic
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is induced. Any TPM object loaded by Progger 3 is also flushed in the error
paths, so that the TPM does not reach its limit of loaded objects.
Having described the TPM operations within Progger 3, a proof its cor-
rectness can be found in chapter 5.
4.6.3 TPM benefits
Combining the use of a TPM with Progger 3’s kernel-only mode means that
a cryptographic key is available to Progger 3 and user space can never access
it. This means that it is impossible for user space to create forged provenance
records that would verify when decrypted by the remote server. Thus, the
tamper-proof property extends to cover sending provenance over the network
while in the presence of a malicious user space. This is the achievement of
design goal B.
4.7 Performance improvements
The improvement to performance in Progger 3 is one of its significant ad-
vancements over Progger 1 and Progger 2. The improvements, in terms of
benchmarks, can be found in chapter 6. This section focuses on the steps
taken to achieve the performance increase.
The primary reason that a provenance system that monitors system calls
would reduce system performance is that extra code is run each time a system
call executes. This code does not run in parallel with the system call; instead,
it runs as a step in the system call’s execution, increasing the total execution
time of the system call. With system calls being a common operation, this
can significantly slow down many workloads if work is not done to minimise
the length of time this extra code takes to run. Minimising this extra code
run upon each system call is primarily the reason that Progger 3 is so much
faster than its predecessors. Essentially, all Progger 3 does when a system call
executes is collect information about the system call and write it to a ring
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buffer. Any further processing, such as encryption and transferring the data
over TCP, is done by a separate kernel task (which is essentially a separate
process or thread). These separate kernel tasks run in parallel with other tasks
on the system, so they do not directly add to system call execution time. As
long as one ensures that these tasks do not use excessive CPU time, the overall
decrease in system performance is not too severe.
As previously mentioned, one of the steps Progger 3 takes that adds to a
system call’s execution time is adding data to a ring buffer. As such, time
has been spent ensuring that the ring buffer implementation in Progger 3 is
efficient. One ring buffer is created for each CPU, to reduce contention, which
naturally improves efficiency. Having to support elements of variable length
means that the ring buffer is not entirely lockless, but care has been taken to
ensure that the locks are held only very briefly. As a result, adding data to
the ring buffer is a relatively quick operation.
So, Progger 3 has achieved its efficiency by separating system call data
collection from data processing and having code that works in an efficient
manner. We consider Progger 3 to be the first iteration of Progger that can
be reasonably used in a wide range of workloads without reducing system
performance to an unacceptable level. So, design goal E is achieved.
4.8 Ability to trace any system call
Progger 3 is able to trace any Linux system call, of which there are over 300 on
x86-64 [4] (the exact number depends on the kernel configuration). In contrast,
Progger 1 is only able to trace 32 system calls [2], and Progger 2 only supports
23. This is because Progger 3 uses a single, simple function for handling every
system call, while Progger 1 and Progger 2 both use a separate function for
each system call that they support (although sometimes one function is used
for multiple similar system calls).
The design of Progger 1, where system calls were wrapped by replacing the
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address of the system call functions, naturally led to writing a new function for
each supported system call. Meanwhile, with tracepoints, which Progger 2 and
Progger 3 use, one callback function is executed upon each system call entry
and another upon each system call exit. Details about the executing system
call can be collected from inside the callback. Progger 3 provides a single
function as the callback to the both the system call entry and exit tracepoints,
and as such can trace any system call with a single function. However, the
callback function used in Progger 2 for the system call entry tracepoint still
ends up calling individual functions for different system calls.
So, how is it that Progger 3 uses a single, simple function to trace every
possible system call? A lot of the information can be collected in the same
way across different system calls. For example, the system call number, the
system call return value, process and user IDs of the currently executing task.
But there is some variation in, for example, the system call arguments needing
to be collected. Progger 3 tries to keep the management of these differences
simple by using a single code path for each system call. It does this by keeping
a table with a small amount of metadata about each system call. Most of
this metadata is concerned with which of the arguments are C-strings and, in
fact, most system calls do not need any metadata added to this table. This
metadata doesn’t need to include the number of arguments to the system call.
Copying the maximum of six arguments each time ensures that each system
call will always have all its arguments copied, and is probably even faster than
trying to copy exactly only the number required, as that increases the size of
the metadata table that has to be loaded into cache. Any excess arguments
can be ignored when the data is processed later by other programs. With this
approach, a single code path can deal with tracing any system call, as can be
seen in section A.20, particularly the syscall_tp function.
It is worth pointing out that Progger 3’s syscall_tp function, which deals
with tracing each system call, is not very long or complex. In fact, it is only
45 lines, excluding whitespace. So, in addition to the extra usability of being
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able to trace any system call, the single code path massively reduces code
complexity and increases maintainability.
Naturally, design goal F is met.
4.9 Stability
During the development of Progger 3, extensive care was taken to ensure that
it can be run for extended periods of time without crashing or harming the
system. Having completed development, no system instability has been ob-
served with the completed version of Progger 3 loaded. Further, no warnings
or errors from any kernel subsystem were printed to the kernel log 3 (as read
with dmesg ), even when running on a kernel with many of the debug options
enabled under the “kernel hacking” configuration section.
We estimate that Progger 3 has been run for at least two hundred hours
during testing, with the longest single run perhaps being eight hours. Progger 3
is likely to be able to run for much longer than eight hours, however; perhaps
months or years. In addition to the runtime testing, we carefully checked the
code itself for correctness.
This improvement is quite noticeable when comparing with Progger 2. In
the tests presented in chapter 6, Progger 2 caused a lot of system instability.
This instability prevented us from being able to measure Progger 2’s perfor-
mance to the same accuracy as other programs.
Hence, design goal I is met.
3The only exceptions to this were that Progger 3 warned when running without using the
TPM—which is benign when done intentionally during testing—and that some ring buffer
overflows occurred, as sometimes the test server didn’t receive the data sent by Progger 3
fast enough, due to data reception and processing being on the same thread in the server.
45
4.10 Maintainability
While not explicitly listed in the design goals of Progger 3, as it is a somewhat-
difficult metric to quantify, part of Progger 3’s architecture is to have a main-
tainable code base.
Progger 3 was developed against Linux 5.8.y. It very slightly modifies two
files already present in Linux 5.8.y: Kconfig , and drivers/net/Makefile ,
adding just three lines of code to each. Then, it rewrites the README file to
give information on Progger 3. The rest of the added code is self-contained.
So, rebasing against later versions of Linux should be straightforward.
The patch in this thesis implementing Progger 3 adds 2465 source lines of
code, 130 lines of comments, and 655 blank lines. This includes the kernel
client, the server, and the TPM provisioning scripts. As such, with a small
amount of code, maintenance should be relatively easy.
Additionally, since Progger 3 uses a single code path to process each system
call, it is straightforward to make changes to the data that is gathered for
each system call. Subsection 4.3.2 explains why the timestamp collected by
Progger 3 uses nanoseconds since system boot. If a user decides that the
system clock’s value would better suit their use case, the change could be
made simply, only needing to change one line in a single location, as the diff
in Listing 4.2 shows.
Listing 4.2: Changing Progger 3’s timestamp collection
1 --- a/drivers/net/progger/kernel/tracepoints.c
2 +++ b/drivers/net/progger/kernel/tracepoints.c
3 @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static void syscall_tp(struct pt_regs *regs, u8
tp_src)
4
5 data->nr = id;
6 data->tp_src = tp_src;
7 - data->ts = ktime_get_mono_fast_ns();
8 + data->ts = ktime_get_real_fast_ns();
9 data->ret = tp_src == TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT ?
regs_return_value(regs) : 0;
10
11 data->pid = current->pid;
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4.11 Conclusion
Progger 3 has an architecture with many parts, but still retains simplicity,
with each architectural decision having been made carefully and purposefully.
The final architecture achieves all the design goals laid out in section 1.1, with
each individual design goal’s achievement being described in this chapter. But,
by meeting these goals, what exactly does Progger 3 achieve?
By ensuring kernel-only operation, along with the use of strong cryptogra-
phy and a TPM, Progger 3 can provide tamper-proof logging of provenance.
This prevents tampering of provenance, both on the system running the Prog-
ger 3 client, and while the provenance is in transit to another system. Addi-
tionally, the provenance is confidential while in transit. Although we could not
guarantee high levels of availability in the Progger 3 client, due to system de-
sign outside the scope of Progger 3, one can still be confident that all collected
provenance is correct.
Also, the message format that Progger 3 uses to send provenance to a
remote server allows for future expansion. If desired, additional sources of
provenance could be implemented, or existing sources could have more detail
collected from them. All this can be done while allowing the servers receiving
the provenance to maintain compatibility with older versions of the Progger 3
client. The message format is also designed so that data is transferred in
binary form, reducing the bandwidth needed.
Furthermore, an efficiency-focused design means that Progger 3 can realis-
tically be used under many workloads, as is explored in chapter 6. The focus
on simplicity resulted in increased usability: one can trace any system call;
expect continuous, error-free operation; and easily modify Progger 3 to suit
their needs.
Chapter 5
TPM Usage Proof of
Correctness
This chapter proves that Progger 3’s use of a TPM prevents user space from
retrieving Progger 3’s symmetric key from the sealed data object. The proof
makes the following assumptions:
• The lockdown and owner authorisation values are not known to an at-
tacker, are infeasible to guess, and no traces of them were left on the
system during provisioning.
• Progger 3 is compiled built-in to Linux, not as a kernel module.
• The TPM provisioning met the requirements in subsection 4.6.1.
• The TPM implements the TPM 2.0 library specification [5] and PC
Client TPM specification [26] correctly.
• Linux’s TPM 2.0 driver follows the specification correctly and doesn’t
attempt to restore state when no state has been saved.
For this proof, a power cycle is defined as the system changing from ACPI
state S4 or S5 to state S0, so that it involves Linux going through a full reboot.
Of the values specified during TPM provisioning for Progger 3, let n be
the index of the PCR, and h be the value of this PCR that is embedded in the
sealed data object’s policy. Note that Progger 3 enforces n ∈ [8, 15].
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Lemma 1: PCR[n] must equal h for the symmetric key to be unsealed.
As the symmetric key is sealed during provisioning, a policy is specified
that states that PCR[n] must be equal to h in order for the TPM to unseal
the object. As user space cannot obtain the owner authorisation value, it is
unable to create an alternative policy that is valid in the context of unsealing
the symmetric key. The result follows.
Lemma 2: Once PCR[n] has its value extended from h, it can only regain
a value of h after the system power cycles.
According to part 1 section 11.6.2 of the TPM 2.0 specification [5], “[t]he
two ways to modify a PCR are to reset it or Extend it”.
First, consider extending PCR[n]. Let v be the current value of PCR[n]. As
chosen during Progger 3’s provisioning process, the hash algorithm associated
with this PCR is SHA256. For PCR[n] to be extended to h, it follows from
the definition of the extend operation [5] that one would have to find a string
of data s such that SHA256(v ‖ s) = h. Finding such an s would be finding
a SHA256 preimage, which, with the current best cryptanalysis, would take
2254.9 operations [27]. This is infeasible, so, extending PCR[n] is not an avenue
to obtain a value of h.
Now, consider resetting the PCR. If the reset value of PCR[n] is not h,
then there is no issue. However, it is expected (although not required) that
h will be the reset value, so it is important to consider how PCR[n] may be
reset. Two of the ways in which a PCR may be reset are the TPM2 PCR Reset
command, and a D-RTM event [5]. However, Progger 3 only allows n ∈ [8, 15].
For each such n, PCR[n] cannot be reset by TPM2 PCR Reset or a D-RTM
event [26]. It should be noted that the guarantee that these PCRs are not
resettable comes from the TPM PC client specification (table 6) [26], not the
TPM library specification, so it is not necessarily true for all TPMs. But, by
assumption, only a PC client TPM needs to be considered. The only other
methods listed in the TPM library specification (part 1 section 17.1) [5] to
reset a PCR is through a TPM Reset/Restart/Resume, which, as per the
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TPM library specification (part 1 section 12.2.3.2) [5], respectively correspond
to a system reboot, resume from hibernation, and resume from suspend. A
system reboot and resume from hibernation require a power cycle, but a system
resume from suspend does not. So, further investigation of the TPM Resume
sequence is required.
Section 12.2.3.2 of the TPM library specification [5] defines a TPM Resume
as a Startup(STATE) that follows a Shutdown(STATE). This section explains
that sequence as calling TPM2_Startup with startupType == TPM_SU_STATE
after TPM2_Shutdown was called with startupType == TPM_SU_STATE . There
is a copy-and-paste error, and TPM2_Shutdown should instead be called with
shutdownType == TPM_SU_STATE , corroborated by the fact that section 9.4 of
part 3 of the TPM library specification [5] lists only a shutdownType param-
eter, not a startupType parameter, for TPM2_Shutdown . Turning to section
9.3.1 of part 3 of the TPM library specification [5], it is shown that a TPM
Resume sequence results in the values of specified PCRs being saved and then
restored, but the exact PCRs are determined by the platform-specific specifi-
cation. Turning to the relevant platform-specific specification, the TPM PC
client specification [26], Table 6 shows that PCRs 0–15 are preserved. So, fi-
nally, it can be seen that the TPM Resume sequence will not reset PCR[n], as
n ∈ [8, 15].
One may wonder what happens if Startup(STATE) occurs without a previ-
ous Shutdown(STATE). As per the TPM library specification (part 1 section
12.2.3.2) [5], TPM_RC_VALUE is returned. The PCR values will be undefined and
may be cleared. This would provide an avenue for PCR[n] regaining the value h
without going through a power cycle. However, it also depends on Linux incor-
rectly issuing the Startup(STATE) and Shutdown(STATE) sequences, which,
by assumption, will never happen.
Having looked at all the methods to modify a PCR, it follows that PCR[n]
can only have its value reset through a power cycle.
Lemma 3: Once Progger 3 has initialised, PCR[n] will always have its
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value extended from h.
If Progger 3 is unable to unseal the key and then extend PCR[n], it will
induce a kernel panic. Thus, PCR[n] will always be extended by the time user
space runs. The extension must be from h, as if the value of PCR[n] were not
h, the unseal would fail so Progger 3 would cause a kernel panic.
Theorem: User space cannot retrieve Progger 3’s symmetric key from the
sealed data object.
When Progger 3 is in kernel-only mode, it will always be initialised before
user space runs. From lemmas 1, 2, and 3, it follows that a power cycle
is required for the object to be unsealed again. But a power cycle would
result in Progger 3 reinitialising before user space has any chance to unseal
the symmetric key. Thus, user space cannot unseal the symmetric key.
All that remains is to verify that the sealed data object stores the sym-
metric key securely at rest, and not in an unencrypted form. The public part
of the sealed data object contains metadata about the object, as described
in the TPM library specification (part 3 section 12.1, along with part 2 sec-
tion 12.2) [5]. Furthermore, part 3 section 12.1 and part 2 section 12.3 of
the TPM library specification [5] show that the private part consists of an
integrity hash, along with an encrypted sensitive area. For the following TPM
specification references, ensure that you are reading the version that contains
the code samples. The code sample in part 3 section 12.1.3 [5] shows how the
encryption is applied to the sensitive area. This code reveals that the private
part, referred to as outPrivate , is created in the SensitiveToPrivate func-
tion. Using part 4 of the TPM specification [5], it follows that the sensitive
data area is encrypted with the algorithm from the parent key supplied to
TPM2_Create . As Progger 3’s provisioning process requires the use of strong
encryption algorithms for the parent key, it follows that the sealed data object
does protect the symmetric key at rest.




This chapter evaluates Progger 3 by determining what performance impacts
may occur under a wide range of workloads. That is, it seeks to evaluate how
much Progger 3 slows these workloads down. Rather than testing a multitude
of individual workloads, this evaluation seeks to provide an understanding at
a more general level about what impacts Progger 3 has on system throughput
and latency. Then, by knowing where the bottlenecks are in specific workloads,
one can have a good idea of how Progger 3 will impact performance under that
workload. The main tests used for this evaluation are: compiling Linux to
determine the impact on system throughput, and running a micro-benchmark
of the openat system call to determine changes in latency. The list of system
calls traced will also be varied to understand how the performance impact can
vary when many or few traced system calls occur.
This evaluation compares Progger 3 to other programs. Some of these
other programs may have scope greater than just a provenance system; so, the
programs are collectively referred to as (system) tracers, of which provenance
systems are a subset.
This evaluation compares tracers that are able to monitor the entire system
call activity on a system and selectively choose subsets to trace, as this is
exactly what Progger 3 does. Some of the provenance systems mentioned
in chapter 3 do not have the ability to do this, so their performance is not
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evaluated here. This evaluation only tests programs that can produce (nearly)
the exact same output as Progger 3.
The following evaluations were performed on a bare-metal system running
on an Intel i3-2120 CPU at 3.30GHz, microcode revision 0x2f. It had 7.73 GiB
of DRAM available. The system was running Debian GNU/Linux 10 (Buster).
The kernel running was Linux 5.8.18, with the patches adding Progger 3 ap-
plied.
In each test, the version used of Sysdig was 0.27.1 , the version of Sys-
temTap was 4.3-119-gacd978b01 (as described by git ), and the version of
bpftrace was 0.11.2 .
6.1 Impact on system throughput
Having a tracer running on a system will occupy some of that system’s re-
sources. As such, there will be fewer resources for other programs to make
use of. Fewer resources available means that programs are likely to experience
reduced throughput; that is, programs will take longer to process a certain
amount of data, or, worded differently, will be able to process less data in a
given time period.
For a given program, its throughput is constrained at any specified moment
by a single bottleneck. These bottlenecks could be the available CPU time,
available memory, disk read/write speed, or available network bandwidth, to
name some common ones.
CPU bottlenecks are quite common, and so are what this evaluation focuses
on first. The disk read/write speed is not relevant to Progger 3. Progger 3
does not require a considerable amount of memory, so it is not meaningful to
pursue an analysis of memory-bottlenecked workloads. Network bandwidth is
relevant, as Progger 3 sends its output over the network, so this evaluation
spends some time analysing Progger 3’s impact in this regard.
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6.1.1 Impact on CPU throughput
As each tracer operates, it takes CPU time to process each system call. If
a system mostly has spare CPU capacity, the impact on throughput may be
negligible. Yet, in situations with no spare CPU capacity, each moment a CPU
spends executing a tracer is time that another program has lost.
If a tracer is opting to trace more system calls, or the system calls being
traced occur more frequently, the tracer will spend more CPU time process-
ing the system calls, reducing the throughput of CPU-bound programs. The
frequency of system calls not being traced is of less importance: if a tracer
is notified of a system call occurring that it isn’t tracing, it should not spend
any time processing it, so only a small amount of time would be spent in
determining that the system call is not to be traced.
So, we conducted tests to assess the throughput of some workloads that
make full utilisation of available CPU time. The results of these tests are
presented in the following sections. The first test is compiling a Linux kernel
while tracing some common system calls. The second test repeats compiling
the Linux kernel, but traces only a system call that never occurs. The third
test is a program that utilises all free CPU time without making system calls.
Given that the throughput impact depends only on the frequency of system
calls and the portion of system calls traced, these tests should give a reliable
overview of each tracer’s impact on system throughput where the CPU is the
bottleneck.
6.1.1.1 Time to compile Linux 5.8.3
In this test, Linux 5.8.3 was compiled 48 times per tracer evaluated. The
.config file was generated by running make allnoconfig . Compiling Linux
involves lots of system calls being made, such as openat , read , and write .
With each tracer tested, the following system calls were traced: open ,
openat , openat2 , rename , renameat , renameat2 . There were three reasons
for this selection. First, the system calls should occur frequently during the
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test, and openat certainly does. Second, they should be system calls that
have C-strings as arguments, but not any other pointers as arguments. This is
because Progger 3 copies C-string arguments, such as file paths, but no other
pointer values. Copying C-strings is a relatively expensive operation, so it is
important to account for its overhead in this test. Furthermore, this selection
of arguments ensures that the comparison between tracers is fair, as it means
that no tracer is copying arguments that Progger 3 is not. Third, only a small
number of system calls are traced, to reflect what may be a reasonable real-
world use of tracing. It is unlikely that one would want to collect information
about every read and write performed on the system, but recording all files
openings is somewhat more realistic.
Continuing with pursuing fairness, the output of each tracer has to be di-
rected somewhere. Progger 3 encrypts its output and sends it over TCP, and
is the only tracer of those tested in this evaluation with a built-in method of
doing so. Instead of using separate programs to encrypt and transfer the out-
put over TCP, each tracer other than Progger 3 simply had its output directed
to /dev/null . This is so the results are not influenced by the efficiency of
external programs used for encryption and transferring the output over TCP;
rather, the results reflect only the actions performed by the tracer itself. This
does give Progger 3 a slight disadvantage, but, as the results will show, Prog-
ger 3 still manages to be comfortably faster than the rest. There is little need
for this analysis to determine exactly how much greater that margin could be.
Each tracer has its own mode of operation, so a list now follows providing
any notable information about the use of each tracer in these tests.
Progger 3 — The output was sent via TCP to a physically separate
system, so the system running the Progger 3 client did not incur any undue
overhead from running the Progger 3 server. It was also confirmed by checking
the output of dmesg that Progger 3’s ring buffer never overflowed.
Sysdig — The following command was used to run Sysdig:
1 sudo ./userspace/sysdig/sysdig -p ’%evt.arg.name’ evt.type=open or
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evt.type=rename or evt.type=openat or evt.type=renameat or
evt.type=renameat2 or evt.type=openat2 >/dev/null
SystemTap — The following command was used to run SystemTap:











The system call openat2 was not supported by SystemTap at the time of
testing. However, openat2 was never called while compiling Linux.
bpftrace — The following command was used to run bpftrace :























22 printf("%s %s\n", str(args->oldname), str(args->newname));
23 }
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Figure 6.1: Linux compile test results
Each sample in this test is the real time for a single Linux compile. Before
collecting the samples, Linux was compiled once with make -j6 bzImage , so
that further compilations would be using cached files, leading to more consis-
tent results. The following command was used to collect the samples:
1 for n in {1..48}; do (make clean && time make -j6 bzImage); done
The results are presented in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1. These results appear
reliable, as shown by the small standard error in Table 6.1. Progger 3 performs
excellently in this test, causing by far the smallest performance reduction.
Progger 1 was not tested, as, being developed against Linux 2.6.32, it no
longer compiles on Linux 5.8.18 without significant changes. However, the
latency impact of Progger 1 is evaluated in subsection 6.2.1.
There was one other tracer tested: Progger 2. Unfortunately, there were
several issues that prevented an analysis as thorough as the other traces.
It should be noted that the source code of Progger 2 had to be modified
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Tracer Sample size Sample mean / seconds Standard error
None 48 61.427 0.010
Progger 3 48 62.084 0.010
SystemTap 48 62.468 0.015
Sysdig 48 64.736 0.019
bpftrace 48 65.205 0.014
Table 6.1: Real time to compile Linux
slightly to get it to compile with Linux 5.8.18, but this amounted to a Make-
file change and switching to 64-bit time structures. Neither of these should
meaningfully impact performance.
To start with, Progger 2 supports only the following system calls: open ,
read , pread64 , write , pwrite64 , close , mkdir , rmdir , rename , dup ,
dup2 , sendfile , link , unlink , unlinkat , symlink , chmod , fchmod ,
chown , fchown , lchown , pipe , pipe2 . This is not compatible with the
system call set used for testing the other tracers, as openat is missing. Fur-
thermore, openat is the only system call that was used for opening files when
compiling Linux during these tests. This is because open has been deprecated
and openat2 has not seen widespread adoption yet. So, for this comparison,
the system call set used is simply all of the system calls traced by Progger 2.
The second issue is that Progger 2 caused system instability. The system
was prone to crashing, so only one sample was collected. Furthermore, gcc
would often segfault while compiling Linux. The one sample collected is shown
in Listing 6.1. As with Progger 3, the output of Progger 2 was sent over TCP
to a physically separate system.




This is an interesting result, as it appears that Linux has been compiled
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in a time faster than with no tracer running. The reality is that, since gcc
terminated with a segfault many times, Linux was not properly compiled, and
the lower time reflects that fact that less work was done. While the difference
in real time is unsuitable for comparison, it can be seen that the system CPU
time taken was 33.194 seconds, an increase compared to the mean of 21.951
seconds with no tracer loaded, and the mean of 22.149 seconds (n = 8) with
Progger 3 loaded and tracing this new system call set. From this increase in
system CPU time taken, we coarsely estimate that Progger 2 causes a 50%
reduction in CPU throughput when compiling Linux.
It should be noted that Progger 2 sends somewhat different data to Prog-
ger 3. For example, Progger 2 always sends the inode number of files read and
written. Still, there is an exceptional difference in performance between the
two, to the point that one could reasonably expect that Progger 3 could be
modified to collect the same data as Progger 2 while maintaining its perfor-
mance lead.
6.1.1.2 Time to compile Linux 5.8.3 with no traced system calls
occurring
In this test, Linux 5.8.3 was compiled in the same manner as in subsubsec-
tion 6.1.1.1. But this time, Progger 3 traces only tuxcall , which is an unim-
plemented system call that no longer has any legitimate use. This means that
Progger 3 does attach to the sys_exit tracepoint, but its tracepoint handler
exits very quickly, as Progger 3 never encounters a system call that it has been
instructed to trace. Sysdig also traces tuxcall for this test. In contrast, bpf-
trace and SystemTap trace sched_rr_get_interval , as they do not support
tuxcall . This difference isn’t significant, as sched_rr_get_interval is never
called during the test.
The results in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2 show that Progger 3 is performing
respectably in this metric, being on par with bpftrace and SystemTap, and
indeed performing better than Sysdig.
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Figure 6.2: Linux compile test results
Tracer Sample size Sample mean / seconds Standard error
None 48 61.233 0.009
Progger 3 48 61.395 0.013
SystemTap 48 61.374 0.011
bpftrace 48 61.423 0.014
Sysdig 48 63.062 0.010
Table 6.2: Real time to compile Linux, no traced system call occurring
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6.1.1.3 Impact on a CPU-bound program making no system calls
In this test, the program shown in Listing 6.2 was run, with one instance for
each available CPU:










This caused 100% CPU utilisation. Meanwhile, Progger 3 was loaded, and
tracing the same system calls as in subsubsection 6.1.1.1.
The execution time was measured 48 times with the following command:
1 for n in {1..48}; do time ( for m in $(seq "$(nproc)"); do
/tmp/no-syscall & done; wait ); done
After excluding extreme outliers that occurred both with no tracer running
and with Progger 3 running, there was only a 0.01% difference in the mean
execution time when Progger 3 was loaded, with a standard error of 0.049%.
We conclude that there is no meaningful difference present in these results.
Hence, there is no need to test any of the other tracers for comparison, as
Progger 3 is performing ideally in this metric, so no other tracer could perform
better.
6.1.2 Impact on network throughput
In this test, Linux 5.8.3 was compiled as described in subsubsection 6.1.1.1.
But, this time, the test measures the network traffic generated. Performing
the compilation once, 171 MiB of traffic was generated, which is an average
throughput of 21.3 Mbps. This is quite a significant impact, and would not
be desirable in many cases where the network is the bottleneck of a workload.
Progger 3 tries to efficiently pack the data it sends, keeping data in binary form
61
instead of translating it to human-readable strings. So, to reduce the amount
of data sent, there are two options: use compression, or further restrict what
Progger 3 traces. Compression would involve extra CPU time, and, in many
cases, this could nullify any benefit from the reduction in data sent. Still, it
may be worth at least investigating in some cases. With regards to further
restricting what Progger 3 traces, restrictions are currently limited to which
system calls are selected to be traced. In the future, one could implement in
Progger 3 the ability to restrict tracing of system calls based on the system
call’s arguments. For example, it could be enforced that openat would only
be traced for paths under /example/secret/dir , which has great potential to
reduce network overhead.
6.2 Impact on system latency
Progger 3 operates by attaching to Linux tracepoints, resulting in extra code
being run when a system call is made. One would expect this to introduce
additional latency to system calls. This section seeks to determine precisely
how significant the latency increases of Progger 3 and similar system tracers
are.
The latency increase may not be constant between different system calls.
Some system calls may take less time to process, such as those with only integer
arguments, having no C-strings to be copied. Furthermore, system calls may
incur increased latency even when they are not specifically being traced. This
can arise, as is the case with Progger 3, by the fact there are only two system
call tracepoints available: one for system call entry, and one for the system
call exit. That is, a tracepoint handler will always be executed when a system
call runs, no matter the system call. If the system call is not being traced,
then the tracepoint handler can be exited quickly, but some time will still be
spent.
Given these facts, we conducted two tests. The first analyses the time
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taken for openat to complete while it is being traced. This system call has a
string argument specifying the file to open, so the latency increase will include
the impacts of string copies. The file opened each time is /dev/null . The
second test is similar, except it analyses the time taken for openat to complete
while it is not being traced. For Progger 3 at least, one can expect the latency
increase shown to be true of every system call not being traced, as Progger 3
uses a single code path for each system call.
The commands used to run each tracer were the same as given in the CPU
throughput tests. It was also verified that Progger 3 did not experience any
ring buffer overflows.
To reduce variance in the results, the following measures were taken: Tur-
boBoost was disabled, giving a constant maximum CPU frequency; the pro-
gram executing openat was pinned to a single CPU, which the program had
exclusive use of (at least, among user space tasks, as kernel tasks cannot be
arbitrarily prevented from running on specific CPUs), and any of that CPU’s
siblings were also reserved; the performance CPU governor was used, so that
the CPU would always run at its maximum frequency; a high-resolution timer
was used: a constant-rate time stamp counter (TSC); and openat was called
1,000,000 times before the timing started so that it would be warm/cached.
Time was measured in CPU clock cycles. This can be approximately con-
verted to µs by dividing by 3,300, since the CPU these tests were performed
on ran at a (near-)constant 3.30 GHz.
Unfortunately, Progger 2 could not be tested, as it would cause the system
to crash as soon as the test started.
6.2.1 Impact on a system call being traced
This analysis begins by looking at a sample of 50,000 openat calls taken with
no tracer running. To allow a graph of this sample to be readable, any value
above the 99.9th percentile is excluded, amounting to excluding 50 of the sam-
ples. The five largest samples excluded are 1,091,496, 1,196,196, 1,256.292,
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Figure 6.3: Time taken for openat to complete
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1,795,448, and 1,797,332 clock cycles. This sample is presented in Figure 6.3.
The distribution is bimodal and appears to be composed of two separate dis-
tributions, each non-normal with a right skew. Given this distribution, along
with the extreme outliers excluded, it is clear that the mean is not an appro-
priate statistic for this analysis. Still, the median and 99th percentile of the
samples can be calculated as reasonable indicators of performance.
For each tracer, 48 samples, S1, . . . , S48, were collected, where each sample
Sn is a set of 5,000,000 execution times of openat . This approach is taken so
that, when the median and 99th percentile are estimated, the distribution of
Sn gives some idea of what confidence can be placed in the results. To estimate
the median and 99th percentile for each set of samples S := {S1, . . . , S48}, the
following calculations are used:
median(S) = median(median(S1), . . . ,median(S48)),
percentile99(S) = median(percentile99(S1), . . . , percentile99(S48)).
In Figure 6.4, the error bars show the range of median(Sn) for each n.
Similarly, in Figure 6.5, the error bars show the range of percentile99(Sn) for
each n.
Looking at Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5, Progger 3 can be seen quite com-
fortably leading in terms of system call latency overhead. Furthermore, the
error bars in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5, which represent the range of values,
give confidence in these measurements, despite the unfavourable distribution
of samples shown in Figure 6.3,
Finally, this metric can also compare the performance of Progger 3 to
Progger 1. We could not test Progger 1 directly, as it would have to be
modified too much to compile on Linux 5.8. However, the results from the
paper outlining Progger 1 [2] lists execution time of calls to open increasing
from 3.54µs to 758.7 µs, a 21,000% increase, and calls to write increasing from
299.06µs to 2072.08µs, a 590% increase. Progger 3 performs well relative to
this, with a median 10% increase in openat time when opening /dev/null .
As the read system call involves no string copies in Progger 3, the increase
65
Figure 6.4: Median time taken for openat to complete
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Figure 6.5: 99th percentile of the time taken for openat to complete
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Figure 6.6: Median time taken for openat to complete while not being traced
in execution time would be even less than openat in absolute duration, and
likely less in terms of percentage too.
6.2.2 Impact on a system call not being traced
For this test, as with subsubsection 6.1.1.2, Progger 3 and Sysdig trace only the
system call tuxcall , and bpftrace and SystemTap trace only the system call
sched_rr_get_interval . Again, it was verified that sched_rr_get_interval
was never called during these tests.
Using the same methodology as in subsection 6.2.1, the latency overhead
can be estimated, which is shown in Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7. The results
are similar to subsubsection 6.1.1.2. Progger 3 performs adequately, with
approximately the same overhead as bpftrace. It is interesting to see that
SystemTap shows no overhead. This is potentially because SystemTap uses
kprobes to instrument the system calls, not tracepoints.
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It would be for naught if Progger 3 were not producing correct results. To
check for correctness, a program was run that opened each file found on the
system. It then checked the output of Progger 3 to see if each file opening
was logged, in the correct order, with the correct PID and return code. The
program also opened a small random number of other files before opening the
next file in its list, so that the file descriptor returned by openat would be
varying considerably. This test program has been run several times, completing
each time without error.
Furthermore, many less-structured observations were made of Progger 3’s
output, such as creating and renaming files, ssh ing in to the system running
Progger 3, and background activity. Nothing incorrect was observed in these
situations.
The TPM code paths, from provisioning to unsealing the secret key, have
been tested with a virtual TPM 2.0 device, using swtpm [28] and qemu [29].
Again, these code paths worked without a problem.
We have no reason to suspect that there are any significant flaws in Prog-
ger 3’s correctness.
6.4 Summary
These results are very favourable for Progger 3. They show that, while Prog-
ger 3 is loaded, the impact on system performance can be relatively small.
So, Progger 3 could be reasonably deployed on systems that can afford slight
drops in performance. For workloads that perform few to no system calls, the
performance impact may be effectively zero.
Unfortunately, the network overhead can be quite high, even in somewhat
reasonable configurations of Progger 3, such as tracing all file openings. This
presents opportunities for future improvement: conditionally tracing system
calls based on their arguments, and compression of transferred data.
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While we found a precise comparison between Progger 1, Progger 2, and
Progger 3 to be infeasible, the observations that we were able to make suggest
that Progger 3 has achieved a significant increase in performance and system
stability relative to its predecessors.
When it comes to Progger 3’s performance relative to the other tracers
tested, it should be noted that Progger 3 is developed with very different
goals to the others. The other tracers are more like debugging tools, whereas
Progger 3 is focused on being a provenance system. As such, it is perhaps
not a surprise that Progger 3, designed to run continuously, as part of regular




This chapter will discuss some miscellaneous topics relating to Progger 3, pro-
viding a better idea of where Progger 3 fits within the bigger picture.
Section 7.2 compares some aspects of Progger 3 to similar work, expanding
on what sets Progger 3 apart. Then, section 7.3 explores some issues facing
Progger 3, and presents suggestions for future work to Progger 3 that could
help to resolve these issues.
7.2 Comparison with similar work
7.2.1 Progger 1 and a TPM
The use of a TPM with Progger 1 has been explored by M. M. M. Bany
Taha [3]. We will refer to this work hereafter as Progger 1 (TPM). There
are similarities in objectives between Progger 3 and Progger 1 (TPM): both
centre mostly around providing confidentiality and integrity of the collected
provenance, but there are significant differences in scope.
Firstly, an important distinction is that Progger 1 (TPM) presents a frame-
work design that combines a provenance client with other software, while Prog-
ger 3 is instead focused on providing a high-quality provenance client. We
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consider many aspects of using Progger 3, such as the secure storage of the
logs generated by Progger 3, and the route to achieving a trusted kernel, to be
outside the scope of what Progger 3 should dictate, as there are many possible
approaches depending on the circumstances. Meanwhile, Progger 1 (TPM) in-
corporates methods to store provenance logs with confidentiality, availability,
and integrity, using a TPM to do so, while also detailing means to achieve a
trusted execution environment.
Progger 3 uses a TPM for exactly one task: to store a cryptographic key so
that the kernel may access it, but user space may not. When it comes to the
client, Progger 1 (TPM) does not use the TPM for this at all, instead opting to
require that data be transferred over TLS. Yet, as previously discussed, there
is no full TLS implementation in the Linux kernel, so a user space program
would be required. This thesis avoids evaluating Progger 1 (TPM) in terms
of Progger 3’s design goals, as the evaluation is mostly dependent on the
underlying provenance client used. Yet, in this case, a requirement of Progger
1 (TPM) is to use a user space program. So, Progger 1 (TPM) would not satisfy
design goal A of Progger 3 unless it was amended to utilise a provenance client
like Progger 3 instead of using user space programs.
What Progger 1 (TPM) does use the TPM for on the client, apart from a
trusted execution environment (including remote attestation), is maintaining
the integrity of the data produced by Progger 1. Unlike Progger 3, Progger
1 (TPM) stores raw provenance records on the disk, as files on a regular file
system. This leads to complexities around ensuring that any malicious modi-
fication of the files can be detected. However, in Progger 3, there is no need
for the somewhat-complex client data integrity measurement that is presented
in Progger 1 (TPM). This is because Progger 3 stores all of its data in kernel
memory, which, by assumption, an attacker cannot manipulate when a trusted
kernel is running. If kernel memory could be manipulated by an attacker, the
attacker could modify the collected provenance before any confidentiality or
integrity measures are applied. So, if an attacker could manipulate Progger 3’s
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data locally, Progger 1 (TPM) would also be vulnerable. Furthermore, if one
were to extend Progger 3 to store data on-disk, it would not be necessary
to implement extra integrity checks. This could be achieved by storing data
on the disk only once it has had its confidentiality and integrity imposed by
XChaCha20-Poly1305. Then, no additional special action needs to be taken
to ensure the integrity of the data, as any manipulation will be immediately
picked up when the data is decrypted. Either way, if Progger 3 is storing data
on-disk or not, it can offer a much simpler environment for the client.
So, while the use of a TPM with Progger has been explored previously,
it was for a different use case than Progger 3’s use of a TPM. Progger 3
could be integrated with the framework proposed in Progger 1 (TPM), but
is also able to be more versatile and can be integrated into environments
with different requirements. Progger 3 provides a provenance client that can
send the provenance it collects with confidentiality and integrity from a client
running a trusted kernel to a remote server. Meanwhile, Progger 1 (TPM)
provides a framework that utilises an existing provenance client, and where
the scope extends to setting up a trusted execution environment on the client,
securely storing the provenance logs, and providing remote attestation of the
client.
7.2.2 Detecting commands executed as a different user
One of the four major breakthroughs Progger 1 lists is being able to determine
when a non-root user executes a command with root privileges, logging the
user that executed that command.
We have tested this. As Progger 1 was developed using CentOS 6.4 [2],
the test used a virtual machine running the latest CentOS 6 series release:
CentOS 6.10. Unfortunately, Progger 1 did not log the user running sudo
as user* , as suggested by [2], instead printing root , demonstrated in List-
ing 7.1.
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Listing 7.1: Progger 1 output
1 $ cat /secret-file
2 $ dmesg | grep ’^Progger:0’ | grep /secret-file
3 Progger:0,user,1948,1517,1517,1516,cat,/secret-file,/home/user/,0,1654284880,3
4 $ sudo cat /secret-file
5 $ dmesg | grep ’^Progger:0’ | grep /secret-file
6 Progger:0,user,1948,1517,1517,1516,cat,/secret-file,/home/user/,0,1654284880,3
7 Progger:0,root,1953,1952,1517,1516,cat,/secret-file,/home/user/,0,1452952576,3
This section does not seek to determine the issue in the source code respon-
sible for the output in Listing 7.1. Instead, it analyses the ideas put forward in
the paper presenting Progger 1 [2] for detecting users that execute commands
as a different user. Then, it presents a way to detect this using Progger 3,
which we consider more reliable than the approach in Progger 1.
To start the analysis, it is noted in [2] that, when a user executes sudo ,
some system calls are made as that user before the real and effective user IDs
of the process are switched to the other user (usually 0, which is root). The
example given in [2] is that /etc/passwd is opened by sudo before any user
IDs are switched. It is further suggested by [2] that this can be used to detect
when a user runs sudo . As we understand it, the suggestion here is that
one could analyse the logs generated by Progger 1 to find entries containing
a comm of sudo . From these entries, one might then look for /etc/passwd
being opened before any user IDs are switched. Unfortunately, this can be
circumvented, as shown in Listing 7.2.
Listing 7.2: Replacing the comm of sudo
1 $ ln -s /usr/bin/sudo arbitrary
2 $ ./arbitrary id




6 [1]+ Stopped ./arbitrary
7 $ pgrep arbitrary
8 1697
9 $ pgrep sudo
10 $ cat /proc/1697/comm
11 arbitrary
This shows that, by making a symlink to sudo , one can run sudo with
the process’s comm set arbitrarily. So, this method is not viable for detecting
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when a user runs a command as a different user. Furthermore, the proposed
method would have to account for any executables with the setuid bit set, not
all of which will necessarily be named sudo .
The other idea presented in [2] to detect users running commands as other
users is to look at session IDs. The idea is that the command executed by sudo
(or any other privilege escalation program) will have the same session ID as the
user that initiated sudo . We have created a simple program, new-session ,
whose code is in Appendix B, that shows that this idea does not always hold
true. Listing 7.3 shows running new-session and its output.
Listing 7.3: Output of new-session
1 $ sudo ./new-session id
2 Orig. session ID: 502.
3 Orig. process ID: 1347.
4 New session ID: 1347.
5 Child process ID: 1348.
6 New session ID: 1348.
7 Child process ID: 1349.
8 execvp("id", ["id"])
9 uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
What happens in Listing 7.3 is that sudo is used to gain privileges and
execute the program new-session , which creates a new session. In this new
session, the program is free to do as it wishes using the raised privileges. It
creates multiple new sessions for a reason that is explained very shortly.
We ran sudo strace -ff ./new-session and found that, apart from sys-
tem calls arising from printing debug information, the only system calls that
occurred in the main function (which does not include the system calls made
by the C library during program setup and exit) were clone , setsid , and
exit_group . None of these system calls is traced by Progger 1. Additionally,
new-session calls setsid and fork twice so that the final process’s parent
exits without performing any system calls traced by Progger 1. Hence, one
also cannot look for the parent process ID or parent session ID to determine
the user that ran sudo .
So, as we understand it, the methods proposed in [2] cannot be guaranteed
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to always detect processes that are executed as a user different from the one
that initiated the process. To be able to detect processes executed as a different
user reliably, we have devised the following procedure. In the list of system calls
being traced by Progger 3, include fork , vfork , clone , clone3 , setuid ,
setreuid , and setresuid . Since Progger 3 provides the PID, UID, and EUID
in its system call records, the server receiving the records can then keep a per-
process list of changes in the (E)UID of a process. It could even just record
the original (E)UID the first time any UID-changing system call is executed,
for a simpler implementation. For any system call that occurs later, the server
can check if that process was previously executing as a different user. If it
was executing as a different user, one could find the first user it was executing
as, and thus find the user that initiated the process. This must be repeated
recursively for each parent of the process, to see if any ancestor was initially
running as a different user. To see why, consider sudo sudo <command> . When
determining the ancestors of a process, the server should look at the fork and
clone system call records. This is because processes can change parents, but
what is important is the process that initiated the process in question. The
server can also use the fork and clone records to tell when a PID has been
reused.
The ability to detect processes being executed as another user with this
procedure is new in Progger 3, as previous iterations had no ability to trace
fork , vfork , clone , clone3 , setuid , setreuid , and setresuid .
7.3 Future work
Progger 3 has made advancements, but there are still issues that could be fixed
or improved. The following sections will discuss these issues.
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7.3.1 Utilising the disk to store buffers
Progger 3 stores all of its buffers that contain provenance in kernel memory.
This is useful, as it means that data is easily protected from user space access,
but it is a limited resource. Progger 3 can configure the amount of memory
to use for buffers, and around 512 KiB per CPU has been found to be suf-
ficient when tracing only openat and having a fast network connection to
the Progger 3 server. But, if a large number of traced system calls occur
in a short space of time, or the network connection is unstable, the buffers
could overflow, losing information. In this scenario, the larger amount of stor-
age available from disks could be utilised to avoid losing data. Having data
stored on-disk provides a new avenue by which user space could potentially
tamper with the provenance. Yet, since Progger 3 protects its buffers with
XChaCha20-Poly1305, one wouldn’t need to take extra care in terms of data
confidentiality and integrity, as any tampering could be detected during de-
cryption. Still, care would need to be taken to ensure that user space could
not delete the data stored on the disk by Progger 3.
7.3.2 User space network interface control
In most, if not all Linux-based systems, user space is in control of bringing
network interfaces up and down. This means that user space could bring the
required network interface down to stop Progger 3 from being able to send
provenance. During this time, Progger 3 is still collecting the provenance and
will send it when the connection is restored. However, if the interface is down
for long enough, Progger 3 could run out of room in its ring buffer to store
more data, and provenance would be lost. At least, one may be able to detect
a network interface being disconnected by observing a cessation of system call
records being received by the server without the system call records indicating
a shutdown took place.
In addition to user space being able to control the network interfaces mali-
ciously, there is also the issue that, when using Progger 3 as a built-in module,
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as intended, there is a delay between when system call tracing starts and when
the network interfaces have been brought up by user space. This delay means
that, without reasonably large buffers, Progger 3 is prone to experiencing buffer
overflows early on in the system startup sequence.
This issue could be mitigated to some extent by extending Progger 3 to
store buffers on the disk(s), as we have previously suggested, but it would not
truly fix the problem. User space could disconnect the interface indefinitely, or
just long enough for even the disk space allocated for buffers to run out. One
must also consider that the physical network interface, such as an Ethernet
cable, can be disconnected, or an attacker in the network path could drop
packets, in order to achieve a similar effect.
7.3.3 Task priority
One aspect we considered when designing Progger 3 is that tasks running in
the kernel still have to compete with user space tasks for scheduling priority.
If many high-priority tasks were spawned in user space, and Progger 3’s tasks
were not at a sufficiently high priority, Progger 3 may only get a very small
amount of time to run. By design, using tracepoints, Progger 3 will always be
able to record each system call, regardless of the priority at which Progger 3’s
tasks are running. However, the issue lies in the sending of the data Progger 3
collects. If the tasks Progger 3 spawns do not have a chance to run often enough
to empty the ring buffer of system call records, by sending these records over
TCP to the server, ring buffer overflows may occur. In other words, records
about system calls may be lost.
In order to make such an event less likely, Progger 3 sets the priority of
its tasks to the maximum possible. This does carry some risk, as an errant
Progger 3 task caught in an infinite loop could completely consume a CPU core.
However, we are confident enough in Progger 3’s code quality to implement
this.
This measure protects against systems that genuinely may be experiencing
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high workloads with high-priority tasks. Unfortunately, a malicious actor can
easily lower the priority of kernel tasks using chrt , and then create their own
tasks with higher priorities. When it comes to preventing malicious processes
raising their priority to deny other tasks CPU time, Linux leaves that task to
the administrator in user space (using setrlimit and cgroups , for example),
to the best of our understanding.
One might be able to resolve this issue by making user space unable to
change the priority of kernel tasks, and ensuring the maximum priority of a
kernel task is greater than that of a user space task (at least for the SCHED_FIFO
scheduling policy). We consider this to be absolutely outside the scope of
Progger 3.
So, through creating very high priority tasks, a malicious user space could
affect the availability of system call records generated by Progger 3.
It is at least worth pointing out that this could be fixed by having Progger 3
send the system call record to the remote server while still in the tracepoint.
However, Progger 3 has been designed explicitly not to do this, and use a ring
buffer instead, so that the performance impact is minimal. Any action made
in a system call tracepoint blocks that system call entirely. Sending data over
TCP could take time on the order of milliseconds to complete, compared to
microseconds for a typical system call.
7.3.4 Copying system call pointer arguments
As noted previously, Progger 3 opts to copy only integer and C-string argu-
ments of system calls. This is primarily to reduce code complexity while still
providing the most pertinent information for many use cases. However, should
one desire, judging the increased code complexity to be worthwhile, Progger 3
could be modified to copy all system call arguments, including pointer values.
These pointers may point to complicated structures, so it would take a lot of
care to do correctly.
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7.3.5 Reducing bandwidth usage
As discussed in subsection 6.1.2, Progger 3 can use quite a lot of network
bandwidth. Being able to configure Progger 3 to send data on system calls
where some predicate is matched, such as paths for openat being in a specific
directory, has potential to reduce this bandwidth usage considerably. However,
it would also come at the cost of increased code complexity, and could cause
at least a slight performance hit.
7.3.6 Information leakage
On a system running Progger 3, activity can be inferred by observing network
activity. If Progger 3 is monitoring file accesses, opening a file will almost
immediately cause a network packet to be sent. The details of the action
will be protected from an attacker, but that an action simply occurred can
potentially be useful to an attacker. One potential case is that an attacker
could determine times that a system is in use, and times when it is not, with
higher accuracy than if Progger 3 were not running. This may give the attacker
a better idea of suitable times to carry out other attacks. Actions could be
taken, such as batching messages, to reduce the impact of this information
leakage.
One might also consider periodically rotating the client ID and fixed part of
the XChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce so that it is harder for an observer to match
network traffic to individual systems using Progger 3.
7.3.7 Namespaces
With each system call record collected by Progger 3, the PIDs and UIDs are
relative to their initial namespaces. So, for example, PID 1 inside a container
will be logged with its PID as viewed from outside the container. It is simple
to add support for namespace-relative PIDs and UIDs, but it wasn’t included
in the end as it does make each system call take a reasonable amount of time
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longer to complete. Should there be a case where this tradeoff is worthwhile,
one may wish to implement such support.
7.3.8 The Progger 3 server
Chapter 4 discusses our implementation of a server to receive the data gen-
erated by the Progger 3 client. We consider our implementation to be more
than adequate for the purposes of testing and debugging the Progger 3 client.
The Progger 3 client is by far the most important component of the two: there
could be many different servers for Progger 3, each with their own goals, but
the design and goals of the Progger 3 client remain constant. As such, we
wanted to perfect the Progger 3 client, but a server with some minor issues
remained consistent with our goals.
As a result, while our server implementation is quite usable, there are
some minor bugs and unimplemented security features, such as checking the
sequence number of messages (embedded in the nonce). If one desires, there
is work that could be done to create a more secure and widely-useful server
for Progger 3 that may be suitable for real-world deployments.
7.3.9 Choosing which system calls to trace
For comprehensive provenance collection, it can be challenging to determine
exactly which system calls need to be traced. For opening a file, there are three
system calls: open , openat , and openat2 . There is a multitude of system
calls relating to file writing, such as write , pwrite , and lseek , that would
all need to be traced to get a complete picture. Furthermore, a file can be
memory-mapped with with mmap and then written to as a standard memory
object without using system calls.
In contrast, the approach taken in CamFlow [17] of using a Linux Security
Module (LSM) is “guaranteed to capture every event that is deemed security-
sensitive and focus on the objects being accessed, instead of the actions being
carried out on those objects.” This approach could reduce the complexities of
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selecting and processing the correct system calls.
As such, one may wish to explore implementing Progger 3 as an LSM,
seeing if the design goals of Progger 3 (listed in section 1.1) can still be met.
7.4 Summary
This chapter has explored some ways in which Progger 3 differs from similar
work, which may not have been apparent from earlier chapters. It should now
be clear how the existing framework that combines Progger 1 with a TPM [3]
differs from Progger 3; particularly, the framework does not provide a prove-
nance client implementation. Compared to this framework, Progger 3 is able
to be used in a wider variety of environments, owing to its more focused scope.
Additionally, Progger 3 is better equipped to deal with detecting commands
being executed as different users, compared to previous versions of Progger.
This chapter has also covered some issues we have identified in Progger 3,
and made suggestions for how one may approach fixing these issues. For all
of these issues, there was a reason that we did not resolve the issue in Prog-
ger 3: either that the issue is outside the scope of Progger 3 (subsections 7.3.2
and 7.3.3); or fixing the issue involves trade-offs, such as increased complexity
(subsections 7.3.1, 7.3.4, 7.3.5, and 7.3.6) or reduced performance (subsec-
tion 7.3.7); or that the issue is not one to be fixed per se, but rather a project
in its own right for future exploration (subsections 7.3.8 and 7.3.9). Although
these issues exist, they do not stop Progger 3 from achieving its design goals.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis has presented Progger 3, a provenance system that traces Linux
system calls in order to collect provenance of data. Progger 3 has made many
advancements relative to its predecessors: Progger 1 and Progger 2. In partic-
ular, Progger 3 is vastly more performant, to the point where we consider it
the first iteration of Progger that can be realistically used in many real-world
workloads without causing an unacceptable loss in performance. In addition
to performance, Progger 3 offers a new level in security, being able to ensure
the collected provenance cannot be tampered with, so long as the kernel on
the client is not compromised. The provenance is tamper-proof even in the
event of a compromised user space on the client. Furthermore, Progger 3 is
a working implementation of our ideas, and it shows excellent stability and
ease of use. Finally, Progger 3 is able to trace any system call, compared to
the relatively small subsets supported in Progger 1 and Progger 2. We believe
that, should one desire to use a secure, efficient data provenance system that
traces system calls, Progger 3 will likely meet their needs better than any other
existing system.
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Progger 3 source code
These files are placed in the Linux source tree. Development was done against
Linux 5.8.y, but it would be straightforward to rebase to a later version.
Progger 3 is licensed under the GPLv2.
A patch file for this code against Linux 5.8.y is attached to this PDF
for easier access if you want to use the source code. Right-click and save
to obtain it.
A.1 Kconfig (diff)
1 diff --git a/Kconfig b/Kconfig
2 index 745bc773f567..f3ad6ff1ad80 100644
3 --- a/Kconfig
4 +++ b/Kconfig











1 diff --git a/drivers/net/Makefile b/drivers/net/Makefile




5 @@ -82,3 +82,6 @@ thunderbolt-net-y += thunderbolt.o
6 obj-$(CONFIG_USB4_NET) += thunderbolt-net.o
7 obj-$(CONFIG_NETDEVSIM) += netdevsim/
8 obj-$(CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER) += net_failover.o
9 +
10 +obj-$(CONFIG_PROGGER) += progger/
11 +subdir-$(CONFIG_PROGGER) += progger
A.3 drivers/net/progger/Kconfig
1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2
3 menu "Progger configuration"
4
5 config PROGGER
6 tristate "Progger support"
7 depends on X86
8 depends on 64BIT












21 hex "Client ID"
22 default 0xcafe1337
23
24 endif # Progger
25
26 endmenu # Progger configuration
A.4 drivers/net/progger/Makefile
1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2
3 subdir-$(CONFIG_PROGGER) += kernel
4 subdir-$(CONFIG_PROGGER) += server
5
6 obj-$(CONFIG_PROGGER) += kernel/
7 obj-$(CONFIG_PROGGER) += server/
A.5 drivers/net/progger/kernel/Kconfig






6 # Each tracepoint config must be of the form PROGGER_TRACEPOINT_x, where x is
7 # the name of an available tracepoint. This is so the resulting config can be
















24 string "System calls to trace"
25 depends on PROGGER_TRACE_SYSCALLS
26 help







34 endmenu # Tracepoints
35
36 config PROGGER_USE_TPM





42 For development or testing, it may be preferable to use a





48 int "PCR to allocate to Progger"




53 hex "Parent key handle"
54 help
55 The handle of the key used to seal the ChaCha20-Poly1305 key.
56 It is not the handle of the ChaCha20-Poly1305 key.
57
58 config PROGGER_TPM_PUBLIC_BLOB
59 string "Public blob path"
60 help




64 string "Private blob path"
65 help
66 The path to the private blob generated while sealing the crypto key.
67
68 config PROGGER_PANIC_WHEN_KEY_UNSECURED
69 bool "Panic when the sealed crypto key is left unsecured"
70 default y
71 help
72 The crypto key can only be unsealed once per boot. If an error occurs
73 when the crypto key is being unsealed, user space could potentially
74 unseal the key later. The only option left to protect the crypto key
75 from user space is to force a kernel panic.
76
77 This should only be set to N for development or testing.
78
79 config PROGGER_PANIC_WHEN_NO_TPM_FOUND
80 bool "Panic when no TPM device can be found"
81 depends on PROGGER_PANIC_WHEN_KEY_UNSECURED
82 default y
83 help
84 To be extra sure that the crypto key is not accessible to user space,
85 Progger can panic if it doesn’t find a TPM.
86
87 Suppose Progger is compiled built-in, and the TPM driver is compiled
88 only as a loadable module. In this case, Progger will not find the
89 TPM during initialisation, but the TPM will become available to
90 the system when the TPM module is loaded from user space. As
91 such, Progger is unable to unseal the crypto key and secure it
92 from user space.
93
94 If you have ensured that the relevant TPM driver is compiled
95 built-in, then this option is not needed. In such a case, it
96 could be beneficial to disable this option, as that would mean
97 that system is still bootable if the TPM hardware fails.
98
99 config PROGGER_PANIC_WHEN_TPM_IS_NOT_VERSION_2
100 bool "Panic when TPM device is not a TPM 2.0 device"
101 depends on PROGGER_PANIC_WHEN_KEY_UNSECURED
102 default y
103 help
104 Progger requires a device supporting TPM 2.0. If this is not the
105 case, Progger cannot protect the sealed crypto key from user space.
106 The only option left to protect the crypto key from user space is to
107 panic the kernel.
108
109 If this option is not set, and Progger encounters a device that
110 does not support TPM 2.0, Progger won’t try to unseal the key;
111 instead, Progger will just fail its initialisation.
112
113 endif # PROGGER_USR_TPM
114
115 config PROGGER_NET_DSTADDR
116 string "Destination IP address"
117 default "::1"
118 help
119 The IP address to send records to. Both IPv4 and IPv6 are supported.
120
121 config PROGGER_RINGBUF_SIZE




125 The number of kilobytes per CPU to use as a buffer for records.
126 Large buffers might be required to prevent data loss when a lot
127 of traced events occur in a small timeframe.
128
129 If Progger is compiled built-in instead of as a module, there will be
130 a period where Progger is collecting records but is unable to send
131 them, as the network interfaces are not yet up. The ringbuffer size
132 can be increased to compensate for that.
A.6 drivers/net/progger/kernel/Makefile
1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2
3 obj-$(CONFIG_PROGGER) := progger.o
4
5 progger-y := init.o
6 progger-y += tracepoints.o
7 progger-y += crypto.o
8 progger-y += net.o
9 progger-y += ringbuf.o
10 progger-y += kthread.o
11 progger-$(CONFIG_PROGGER_USE_TPM) += tpm.o
12
13 ccflags-y += -O3
14 ccflags-y += -D’pr_fmt(fmt)=KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt’
15
16 syscall-tbl := $(srctree)/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
17
18 generated := $(obj)/generated
19
20 tpm-blobs := tpm-public-blob.h
21 tpm-blobs += tpm-private-blob.h
22
23 clean-files += generated/ip.h
24 clean-files += generated/syscalls.h
25 clean-files += $(addprefix generated/,$(tpm-blobs))
26 clean-files += $(addprefix generated/,$(tpm-blobs).tmp)
27
28 quiet_cmd_progger_gen = GEN $@
29 cmd_progger_gen = $< $(KCONFIG_CONFIG) $@ $(2)
30
31 quiet_cmd_tpm_blob_gen = GEN $@
32 cmd_tpm_blob_gen = \
33 xxd -i >$@.tmp <$(CONFIG_PROGGER_TPM_$(2)_BLOB) && \



















52 $(wildcard $(generated)/*.h): $(KCONFIG_CONFIG)
53



























24 static u8 __read_mostly key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE];
25 static u8 nonce[XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE];
26 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(nonce_lock);
27 static u64 counter;
28
29 int progger_xchacha20poly1305(void **out, size_t *outlen,
30 void *data, size_t datalen,
31 void *ad, size_t adlen)
32 {
33 size_t extralen = CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE + sizeof(nonce);
34
35 if (unlikely(counter == U64_MAX)) {













48 *((u64 *)nonce + 2) = counter++;
49 memcpy(*out, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
50 spin_unlock(&nonce_lock);
51
52 xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(*out + sizeof(nonce), data, datalen,









62 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROGGER_USE_TPM)) {
63 err = tpm_get_chacha20poly1305_key(&key);
64 if (err)
65 return err;
66 } else {
67 pr_warn("Not using TPM, using insecure testing key.\n");
68 memcpy(key, progger_crypto_testkey, sizeof(key));
69 }
70









80 memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
81 }
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8 int progger_xchacha20poly1305(void **out, size_t *outlen,
9 void *data, size_t datalen,
















9 if len(sys.argv) != 3:
10 print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <.config> <output-file>", file=sys.stderr)
11 exit(1)
12
13 dot_config = sys.argv[1]
14 output_file = sys.argv[2]
15 output_lines = []
16
17 with open(dot_config, ’r’) as f:
18 for line in f.readlines():
19 if line.startswith(’CONFIG_PROGGER_NET_DSTADDR=’):
20 addr = line.split(’=’)[-1].strip().replace(’"’, ’’)
21 addr = ipaddress.ip_address(addr)
22
23 formatted = None
24
25 if type(addr) == ipaddress.IPv4Address:
26 v4addr = f’{int(addr)} /* {addr} */’
27 v6addr = ’{ 0, } /* None */’
28 output_lines.append(’#define PROGGER_IPv6 0’)
29 else:
30 v4addr = ’0 /* None */’
31 v6addr = ’,’.join([f’0x{byte:02x}’ for byte in addr.packed])
32 v6addr = f’{{ {v6addr} }} /* {addr} */’
33 output_lines.append(’#define PROGGER_IPv6 1’)
34
35 output_lines.append((f’#define PROGGER_IPv4_DSTADDR {v4addr}’))
36 output_lines.append((f’#define PROGGER_IPv6_DSTADDR {v6addr}’))
37
38 output = ’\n’.join(output_lines) + ’\n’
39















7 TRACEPOINT_CONFIG_START = ’CONFIG_PROGGER_TRACEPOINT_’
8
9
10 def format_c_array(array_name, member_type, contents):
11 newline = ’\n’
12 tab = ’\t’
13
14 if not member_type.endswith(’*’):
15 member_type += ’ ’
16
17 return f’’’\
18 static {member_type}{array_name}[] = {{






25 if len(sys.argv) != 4:




30 dot_config = sys.argv[1]
31 output_file = sys.argv[2]
32 syscall_tbl = sys.argv[3]
33 tracepoints = []
34 traced_syscalls = []
35 syscall_regex = ’’
36
37 with open(dot_config, ’r’) as f:
38 for line in f.readlines():
39 if line.startswith(TRACEPOINT_CONFIG_START):
40 line = line[len(TRACEPOINT_CONFIG_START):]
41 tracepoint = (line.split(’=’)[0].strip().lower())
42 tracepoints.append(f’{{ {tracepoint}_tp, "{tracepoint}" }}’)
43
44 if line.startswith(’CONFIG_PROGGER_TRACED_SYSCALLS’):
45 syscall_regex = line.split(’=’, 1)[1].strip()[1:-1]
46
47 syscall_regex = re.compile(syscall_regex)
48
49 with open(syscall_tbl, ’r’) as f:
50 for line in f.readlines():
51 line = line.strip()
52
53 if not line or line.startswith(’#’):
54 continue
55
56 parts = line.split()







63 tp_type = ’’’\
64 const struct {
65 void *fn;
66 const char *name;
67 }’’’
68
69 output = ’\n’.join((
70 format_c_array(’init_tracepoints’, tp_type, tracepoints), ’’,
71 format_c_array(’init_syscalls’, ’const long’, traced_syscalls), ’’,
72 ))
73




78 if __name__ == ’__main__’:
79 main()
A.11 drivers/net/progger/kernel/init.c
















17 err = tpm_init();
18 if (err) {




23 err = crypto_init();
24 if (err) {




29 err = net_init();
30 if (err) {




35 err = ringbuf_init();
99
36 if (err) {




41 err = tracepoint_init();
42 if (err) {






























73 * We need to use ‘late_initcall‘ so that the TPM driver is initialised
74 * before ‘progger_init‘ runs. It’s fine for ‘progger_init‘ to run earlier
75 * when the TPM isn’t being used, but there’s also no need as there will be




















13 int progger_create_task(struct task_struct **task, int (*threadfn)(void *data),
14 const char *name)
15 {
16 struct task_struct *new;
17 const struct sched_param sp = { .sched_priority = MAX_RT_PRIO - 1 };
18




23 sched_setscheduler(new, SCHED_FIFO, &sp);
24














39 *task = NULL;
40 }
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8 int progger_create_task(struct task_struct **task, int (*threadfn)(void *data),
9 const char *name);
10 void progger_destroy_task(struct task_struct **task);
11
12 #endif /* PROGGER_KERNEL_KTHREAD_H */
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33 static struct net *net = &init_net;
34 static struct socket *sock;
35 static bool sock_ready;
36
37 static struct task_struct *tcp_worker;
38





44 sock_ready = 0;
45 kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_WR);
46 sock_release(sock);
47 sock = NULL;
48 }
49




54 struct sockaddr *dstaddr;
55 const __kernel_sa_family_t family = PROGGER_IPv6 ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET;
56
57 static struct sockaddr_in6 dstaddr6 = {
58 .sin6_family = AF_INET6,
59 .sin6_addr = { .s6_addr = PROGGER_IPv6_DSTADDR },
60 .sin6_port = htons(PROGGER_SERVER_PORT),
61 };
62
63 static const struct sockaddr_in dstaddr4 = {
64 .sin_family = AF_INET,
102
65 .sin_addr = { htonl(PROGGER_IPv4_DSTADDR) },











77 if (family == AF_INET6) {




82 dstaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&dstaddr6;
83 dstaddrlen = sizeof(dstaddr6);
84 } else {
85 dstaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&dstaddr4;
86 dstaddrlen = sizeof(dstaddr4);
87 }
88




93 sock->sk->sk_sndbuf = INT_MAX;
94 sock->sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC;
95





101 static int conn_loop(void *data)
102 {











114 if (!sock_ready) {
115 if (progger_connect() == 0)














129 struct msghdr msg = {};
130 struct kvec iov[2];






137 ad.len = len;
138 ad.len += XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
139 ad.client_id = CONFIG_PROGGER_CLIENT_ID;
140
141 err = progger_xchacha20poly1305(&crypt_output, &crypt_output_len,





147 iov[0].iov_base = &ad;
148 iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(ad);
149 iov[1].iov_base = crypt_output;
150 iov[1].iov_len = crypt_output_len;
151










162 if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
163 if (err == -ECONNRESET || err == -EPIPE) {
164 pr_info_ratelimited("TCP connection reset.\n");










175 int __init net_init(void)
176 {





















12 #endif /* PROGGER_KERNEL_NET_H */
A.16 drivers/net/progger/kernel/ringbuf.c



























28 static struct task_struct *rb_worker;
29 struct record_ringbuf __percpu __read_mostly *ring;
30 DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rb_pde_lock);
31
32 static int ringbuf_alloc(struct record_ringbuf *rb, int cpu, size_t size)
33 {
34 if (size < MAX_RECORD_SIZE) {
35 size = MAX_RECORD_SIZE * 4;
36 pr_info("ringbuf: Alloc size increased to %zu.\n", size);
37 }
38





43 rb->size = size;
44 rb->data_end = 0;
45 rb->consumer = 0;





51 static int send_records(int cpu)
52 {
53 struct record_ringbuf *rb = get_ringbuf(cpu);
54 size_t consumer, producer, data_end;






61 consumer = rb->consumer;
62 spin_lock(&rb_pde_lock);
63 producer = smp_load_acquire(&rb->producer);
64 data_end = smp_load_acquire(&rb->data_end);
65 spin_unlock(&rb_pde_lock);
66
67 if (rb_is_empty(consumer, producer))
68 return 0;
69
70 if (producer > consumer)
71 len = producer - consumer;
72 else if (likely(data_end != 0))





78 * If ‘len‘ is incorrect due to underflow, it should be caught by
79 * checking ‘len > rb->size‘. However, ‘consumer + len‘ could result
80 * in ‘len‘ overflowing, returning ‘len‘ to a reasonable value.
81 * Hence, the two separate checks are done.
82 */
83 if (unlikely(len > rb->size || consumer + len > rb->size)) {




88 paddedlen = ALIGN(len, PROGGER_RECORD_PADDING_ALIGN);
89




94 memcpy(padded, rb->buf + consumer, len);
95
96 do {
97 err = send_encrypted(padded, paddedlen);






























127 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
128 int err = send_records(cpu);
129
130 if (err < 0 && err != -EAGAIN)






















153 err = ringbuf_alloc(per_cpu_ptr(ring, cpu), cpu,













































21 extern spinlock_t rb_pde_lock;
22 extern struct record_ringbuf *ring;
23
24 static inline struct record_ringbuf *get_ringbuf(int cpu)
25 {
26 return per_cpu_ptr(ring, cpu);
27 }
28
29 static inline size_t rb_nextpos(struct record_ringbuf *rb, size_t pos,
30 size_t len)
31 {
32 size_t newpos = pos + len;
33
34 if (unlikely(newpos + MAX_RECORD_SIZE > rb->size))





39 static_assert(__alignof__(struct record) == 1, "Record alignment != 1.");
40
41 static inline bool rb_has_space_left(struct record_ringbuf *rb,
42 size_t consumer, size_t producer)
43 {
44 if (producer > consumer) {
45 size_t nextpos = rb_nextpos(rb, producer, MAX_RECORD_SIZE);
46
47 return nextpos > producer || nextpos < consumer;
48 } else if (consumer > producer) {
49 return producer + MAX_RECORD_SIZE < consumer;





55 static inline bool rb_is_empty(size_t consumer, size_t producer)
56 {
57 return producer == consumer;
58 }
59
60 static inline void rb_mark_produced(struct record_ringbuf *rb, size_t len,




65 if (producer >= consumer)
66 smp_store_release(&rb->data_end, producer + len - 1);
67





73 static inline void rb_mark_consumed(struct record_ringbuf *rb, size_t len,
74 size_t consumer)
75 {






82 #endif /* PROGGER_KERNEL_RINGBUF_H */
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19 #define TPM_CC_Load 0x00000157
20 #define TPM_CC_Unseal 0x0000015e
21 #define TPM_CC_FlushContext 0x00000165
22 #define TPM_CC_StartAuthSession 0x00000176
23 #define TPM_CC_PolicyPCR 0x0000017f
24 #define TPM_RH_NULL 0x40000007
25 #define TPM_RS_PW 0x40000009
26 #define TPM_ALG_NULL 0x0010
27 #define TPM_ALG_SHA256 0x000b
28 #define TPM_SE_POLICY 0x01
29
30 #define TPM_SESSION_ATTR_RETAIN (1 << 0)
31
32 /* PC clients are specified to have at least 24 PCRs, and 24 / 8 = 3. */
33 #define PCR_SELECT_MIN 3
34 #define TPM_NONCE_SIZE 0x20
35
36 static struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip;
37 static u8 crypto_key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE];
38














53 static int tpm_get_response_item(struct tpm_buf *buf, size_t item_offset,
54 void *out, size_t outlen)
55 {
56 u32 response_size = be32_to_cpu(((struct tpm_header
*)buf->data)->length);
57
58 if ((u64)item_offset + outlen > response_size)
59 return -E2BIG;
60





66 static int get_nonce(u8 (*nonce)[TPM_NONCE_SIZE])
67 {




71 static void append_auth_cmd(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
72 u8 *nonce, u16 noncelen, u8 session_attrs,
73 u8 *auth, u16 authlen)
74 {
75 tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + authlen + noncelen);
76 tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle);
77
78 if (nonce && noncelen) {
79 tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, noncelen);
80 tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, noncelen);






87 if (auth && authlen) {
88 tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, authlen);
89 tpm_buf_append(buf, auth, authlen);









99 struct tpm_buf buf;
100





































137 static inline int is_blob_size_congruent(u8 *blob, size_t expected)
138 {
139 if (expected < sizeof(__be16))
140 return false;
141
142 return be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)blob) == expected - sizeof(__be16);
143 }
144
145 static inline void print_blob_size_err(const char *blob_name)
146 {
147 pr_err("TPM: Length embedded in the blob ’%s’ doesn’t match the length "
148 "of the blob given.\n", blob_name);
149 }
150
151 static int load_blob(struct tpm_state *tpm_state, u32 keyhandle,
152 u8 *private, size_t private_size,




157 struct tpm_buf buf;
158
















175 append_auth_cmd(&buf, TPM_RS_PW, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
176
177 tpm_buf_append(&buf, public, public_size);
178 tpm_buf_append(&buf, private, private_size);
179
180 if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
181 pr_err("TPM: Blob is too large.\n");





















202 static int policy_pcr_extend(struct tpm_state *tpm_state)
203 {
204 int err;
205 struct tpm_buf buf;
206 u32 pcr = CONFIG_PROGGER_TPM_PCR;
207 u8 pcr_selection[PCR_SELECT_MIN] = {};
208
209 /* Kconfig should enforce this, but just to be sure... */
210 if (pcr < 8 || pcr > 15) {




215 pcr_selection[1] |= 1U << (pcr % 8);
216











228 tpm_buf_append(&buf, pcr_selection, sizeof(pcr_selection));
229


















248 size = be16_to_cpu(response_size);
113
249
250 if (size != expected_size) {





256 return tpm_get_response_item(buf, TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6, out, size);
257 }
258
259 static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_state *tpm_state, void *out, size_t outlen)
260 {
261 int err;
262 struct tpm_buf buf;
263
























288 static int flush_context(u32 handle)
289 {
290 int err;
291 struct tpm_buf buf;
292











304 static int pcr_extend(u32 pcr)
305 {
306 int i;
307 int res = 0;
308 struct tpm_digest *digests;
114
309 u8 hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
310





316 for (i = 0; i < tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
317 digests[i].alg_id = tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
318 memcpy(digests[i].digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
319 }
320






327 static int tpm_unseal_and_lock_key(void)
328 {
329 int err;
330 struct tpm_state tpm_state = {};
331




336 pr_debug("TPM: Auth session: 0x%08x.\n", tpm_state.auth_session_handle);
337






344 pr_debug("TPM: Blob: 0x%08x.\n", tpm_state.blob_handle);
345













359 if (tpm_state.auth_session_handle) {
360 pr_debug("TPM: Flushing auth session context.\n");
361 if (flush_context(tpm_state.auth_session_handle) != 0)
362 pr_warn("Failed to flush context.\n");
363 }
364
365 if (tpm_state.blob_handle) {
366 pr_debug("TPM: Flushing blob context.\n");
367 if (flush_context(tpm_state.blob_handle) != 0)




371 if (err < 0)
372 return err;
373






380 int tpm_get_chacha20poly1305_key(u8 (*key)[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])
381 {
382 static_assert(sizeof(*key) == sizeof(crypto_key));










393 tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip();
394
395 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tpm_chip)) {
396 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROGGER_PANIC_WHEN_NO_TPM_FOUND))





402 is_tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(tpm_chip);
403
404 if (is_tpm2 != 1) {
405 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROGGER_PANIC_WHEN_TPM_IS_NOT_VERSION_2))
406 panic("TPM: tpm_is_tpm2 returned %d.", is_tpm2);
407
408 if (is_tpm2 < 0)
409 return is_tpm2;
410




415 err = tpm_unseal_and_lock_key();
416
417 if (err) {
418 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROGGER_PANIC_WHEN_KEY_UNSECURED))
419 panic("TPM: crypto key is unsecured!\n");
420















435 memset(crypto_key, 0, sizeof(crypto_key));
436 }
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28 static inline void tpm_exit(void)
29 {
30 }
31 #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROGGER_USE_TPM) */
32
33 #endif /* PROGGER_KERNEL_TPM_H */
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31 struct progger_syscall_info {
32 /*
















49 * If ‘tp_srcs‘ is left unset, it will be later set to the default of
50 * ‘TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT‘.
51 *
52 * See include/linux/syscalls.h and the man page for each syscall.
53 */
54 static struct progger_syscall_info __read_mostly
55 syscalls_info[__NR_syscall_max + 1] = {
56 [__NR_setxattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) },
57 [__NR_lsetxattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) },
58 [__NR_fsetxattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) | BIT(2) },
59 [__NR_getxattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) },
60 [__NR_lgetxattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) },
61 [__NR_fgetxattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
62 [__NR_listxattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
63 [__NR_llistxattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
64 [__NR_removexattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) },
65 [__NR_lremovexattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) },
66 [__NR_fremovexattr] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
67 [__NR_inotify_add_watch] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
118
68 [__NR_mknodat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
69 [__NR_mkdirat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
70 [__NR_unlinkat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
71 [__NR_symlinkat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(2) },
72 [__NR_linkat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) | BIT(3) },
73 [__NR_renameat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) | BIT(3) },
74 [__NR_umount2] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
75 [__NR_mount] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) },
76 [__NR_pivot_root] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) },
77 [__NR_statfs] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
78 [__NR_truncate] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
79 [__NR_faccessat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
80 [__NR_faccessat2] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
81 [__NR_chdir] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
82 [__NR_chroot] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
83 [__NR_fchmodat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
84 [__NR_fchownat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
85 [__NR_openat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
86 [__NR_openat2] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
87 [__NR_quotactl] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
88 [__NR_readlinkat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
89 [__NR_newfstatat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
90 [__NR_utimensat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
91 [__NR_acct] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
92 [__NR_init_module] = { .cstr_args = BIT(2) },
93 [__NR_delete_module] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
94 [__NR_sethostname] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
95 [__NR_setdomainname] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
96 [__NR_mq_open] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
97 [__NR_mq_unlink] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
98 [__NR_add_key] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) },
99 [__NR_request_key] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) | BIT(2) },
100 [__NR_execve] = {
101 .cstr_args = BIT(0),
102 /*
103 * ‘execve‘ doesn’t return to the caller when it succeeds,
104 * and as a result the arguments available in the ‘sys_exit‘
105 * tracepoint are all zero. To get any useful information,
106 * the arguments must be copied during ‘sys_enter‘.
107 *
108 * ‘TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT‘ is added so that failed ‘execve‘ calls
109 * can be detected. It does add some noise for successful
110 * calls, but that noise can be easily filtered out by the
111 * program that processes the records.
112 */
113 .tp_srcs = TP_SRC_SYS_ENTER | TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT,
114 },
115 [__NR_swapon] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
116 [__NR_swapoff] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
117 [__NR_fanotify_mark] = { .cstr_args = BIT(4) },
118 [__NR_name_to_handle_at] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
119 [__NR_finit_module] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
120 [__NR_renameat2] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) | BIT(3) },
121 [__NR_memfd_create] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
122 [__NR_execveat] = {
123 .cstr_args = BIT(1),
124 /*
125 * See the entry for ‘__NR_execve‘ to see why this is done.
126 */
127 .tp_srcs = TP_SRC_SYS_ENTER | TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT,
119
128 },
129 [__NR_statx] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
130 [__NR_open_tree] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
131 [__NR_move_mount] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) | BIT(3) },
132 [__NR_fsopen] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
133 [__NR_fsconfig] = { .cstr_args = BIT(2) | BIT(3) },
134 [__NR_fspick] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
135
136 /* Deprecated syscalls. */
137 [__NR_open] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
138 [__NR_link] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) },
139 [__NR_unlink] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
140 [__NR_mknod] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
141 [__NR_chmod] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
142 [__NR_chown] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
143 [__NR_mkdir] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
144 [__NR_rmdir] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
145 [__NR_lchown] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
146 [__NR_access] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
147 [__NR_rename] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) },
148 [__NR_symlink] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) | BIT(1) },
149 [__NR_utime] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
150 [__NR_utimes] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
151 [__NR_futimesat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(1) },
152 [__NR_creat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
153 [__NR_uselib] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
154 [__NR_kexec_file_load] = { .cstr_args = BIT(3) },
155 [__NR_stat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
156 [__NR_lstat] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
157 [__NR_readlink] = { .cstr_args = BIT(0) },
158 };
159
160 static inline bool arg_is_cstr(const struct progger_syscall_info info,
161 u8 argnum)
162 {
163 return info.cstr_args & BIT(argnum);
164 }
165
166 static inline void record_add_str_user(struct record *record,








175 if (unlikely(record->len >= MAX_RECORD_SIZE))
176 return;
177
178 dst = (char *)record + record->len;
179
180 pagefault_disable();
181 len = strncpy_from_user(dst, str, MAX_RECORD_STR_SIZE);
182 pagefault_enable();
183
184 if (unlikely(len < 0))
185 return;
186
187 if (unlikely(len == MAX_RECORD_STR_SIZE)) {
120
188 dst[MAX_RECORD_STR_SIZE - 1] = ’\0’;
189 record->len += len;
190 } else {




195 static inline unsigned long get_arg_x86_64(struct pt_regs *regs,
196 unsigned int n)
197 {
198 static const unsigned int argument_offs[] = {
199 offsetof(struct pt_regs, di),
200 offsetof(struct pt_regs, si),
201 offsetof(struct pt_regs, dx),
202 offsetof(struct pt_regs, r10),
203 offsetof(struct pt_regs, r8),
204 offsetof(struct pt_regs, r9),
205 };
206
207 return regs_get_register(regs, argument_offs[n]);
208 }
209





215 struct progger_syscall_info syscall;
216 struct record *record;
217 struct record_syscall_x86_64 *data;
218 struct record_ringbuf *rb;
219 size_t producer, consumer;
220
221 id = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
222
223 if (id < 0 || id >= ARRAY_SIZE(syscalls_info))
224 return;
225





231 if (!(syscall.tp_srcs & tp_src))
232 return;
233
234 cpu = smp_processor_id();
235 rb = get_ringbuf(cpu);
236
237 producer = rb->producer;
238 consumer = smp_load_acquire(&rb->consumer);
239
240 if (unlikely(!rb_has_space_left(rb, consumer, producer))) {




245 record = (struct record *)(rb->buf + producer);
246
247 record->len = sizeof(*record) + sizeof(*data);
121
248 record->id = RECORD_SYSCALL_X86_64;
249
250 data = (struct record_syscall_x86_64 *)record->data;
251
252 data->nr = id;
253 data->tp_src = tp_src;
254 data->ts = ktime_get_mono_fast_ns();
255 data->ret = tp_src == TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT ? regs_return_value(regs) : 0;
256
257 data->pid = current->pid;
258 data->uid = __kuid_val(current_uid());
259 data->euid = __kuid_val(current_euid());
260
261 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(data->args); i++) {
262 unsigned long arg = get_arg_x86_64(regs, i);
263
264 data->args[i] = arg;
265
266 if (arg_is_cstr(syscall, i))
267 record_add_str_user(record, (const char __user *)arg);
268 }
269
270 rb_mark_produced(rb, record->len, consumer, producer);
271 }
272












285 struct tp_item {
286 struct list_head list;
287 struct tracepoint *tp;
288 void *probe;
289 void *data;









299 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(syscalls_info); i++)
300 syscalls_info[i].being_traced = 0;
301
302 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(init_syscalls); i++) {
303 long nr = init_syscalls[i];
304















319 return tracepoint_probe_register(tp->tp, tp->probe, tp->data);
320 }
321





327 return tracepoint_probe_unregister(tp->tp, tp->probe, tp->data);
328 }
329
330 static void tp_search_fn(struct tracepoint *tp, void *priv)
331 {
332 struct tp_item *tp_item = (struct tp_item *)priv;
333
334 if (strcmp(tp->name, tp_item->name) == 0)
335 tp_item->tp = tp;
336 }
337
338 static int tp_register(void *probe, const char *name)
339 {
340 int err;





346 new->probe = probe;
347 new->data = NULL;




352 if (!new->tp) {





358 err = tp_item_register(new);












370 static void tp_unregister_all(void)
371 {
372 struct tp_item *tp_item;
373
374 list_for_each_entry(tp_item, &tp_list, list) {
375 if (tp_item_unregister(tp_item) != 0) {
376 pr_warn("Failed to unregister tracepoint: %s\n",
377 tp_item->name);
378 } else {











390 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(init_syscalls); i++) {
391 long nr = init_syscalls[i];
392











404 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(syscalls_info); i++) {
405 if (!syscalls_info[i].tp_srcs)










416 * Set the list of traced syscalls before enbling the tracepoints,
417 * so that we don’t end up momentarily generating data for only
418 * subsets of the syscalls.
419 */






426 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(init_tracepoints); i++) {
427 void *fn = init_tracepoints[i].fn;
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428 const char *name = init_tracepoints[i].name;
429
430 if (fn == sys_enter_tp && !is_sys_enter_tp_needed())
431 continue;
432
433 err = tp_register(fn, name);
434 if (err) {























9 #endif /* PROGGER_KERNEL_TRACEPOINTS_H */
A.22 drivers/net/progger/scripts/tpm/provision
1 #!/usr/bin/env bash
2 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3










14 "${script_dir}/provision-setup" "${tmp_dir}" "${output_dir}" ’&&’
15 chroot "${tmp_dir}" "${script_dir}/provision-inner" "${output_basename}"
16 )
17






2 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3
4 ##
5 ## Do not run this directly unless you’re sure of what you’re doing.
6 ## Instead, run ./provision, which wraps this script to prevent data leaks.
7 ##
8 ## Limitations:
9 ## - Only accepts password auth for lockdown/owner.
10 ## - The PCR value used in the policy is fixed to whatever it is when this
11 ## script is run.












24 if ! type "${cmd}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then











36 version="$(tpm2_create --version | grep -Po ’version=".+?"’ | \
37 cut -d \" -f 2)"
38 tmp="$(printf ’%s\n’ "${version}" "${minver}" | sort -V | head -1)"
39
40 # This is actually checking if ${version} >= ${minver}.






47 swaptotal="$(grep SwapTotal /proc/meminfo | awk ’{print $2}’)"
48
49 if [[ "${swaptotal}" != "0" ]]; then
50 printf >&2 ’Found %d KiB of swap space. ’ "${swaptotal}"
126
51 printf >&2 ’Having swap enabled can lead to memory leaks.\n’
52 printf >&2 ’To prevent memory leaks, consider disabling swap ’
53 printf >&2 ’or using encrypted swap.\n’
54
55 read -r -p ’Continue with swap enabled? [y/N] ’
56










67 read -r -s -p "${prompt}" "${outvar}"
68 echo
69
70 if [[ -z "${!outvar}" ]]; then









80 get_pass "${prompt}" "${outvar}"
81
82 read -r -s -p ’Repeat to confirm: ’ pass_confirmation
83 echo
84
85 if [[ "${!outvar}" != "${pass_confirmation}" ]]; then










96 # Ensure that the auth value isn’t visible to other processes
97 # though the command line arguments.











109 cat <<<"${!authval_var}" | tr -d ’\n’ >"${authval_file}"
110 cat <<<"${!currauthval_var}" | tr -d ’\n’ >"${currauthval_file}"
127
111
112 tpm2_changeauth -c "${hierarchy}" \


















131 # We only need to ensure that the lockdown auth is set. If it is,
132 # we have no need to know the passphrase.
133 if ! is_auth_set lockout; then
134 echo ’Lockout auth is unset. Please set it.’




139 if ! is_auth_set ’owner’; then
140 echo ’Owner auth is unset. Please set it.’
141 get_pass_confirm ’Owner passphrase: ’ owner_pass
142 setauth owner
143 else
144 get_pass ’Owner passphrase: ’ owner_pass
145
146 # Set the passphrase to itself to test whether we have
147 # the correct passphrase.
148 if ! setauth owner owner; then





154 get_pass_confirm ’Crypto key (base64): ’ progger_crypto_key_b64
155
156 read -r -p ’PCR: ’ pcr
157 echo
158
159 if (( pcr < 8 )) || (( pcr > 15 )); then




164 # Remember that the keyfile is being saved to a location on a tmpfs
165 # that is only visible in this process’s mount namespace.
166 base64 -d <<<"${progger_crypto_key_b64}" >"${keyfile}"
167
168 key_actual_len="$(<"${keyfile}" wc -c)"
169 if [[ "${key_required_len}" != "${key_actual_len}" ]]; then













182 tpm2_createpolicy -l "${hashalg}:${pcr}" --policy-pcr \
183 --policy /tmp/policy >/dev/null
184 auth owner tpm2_createprimary -c /tmp/ctx >/dev/null
185
186 # XXX: The output is YAML, but grep/awk are used.
187 persistent_handle="$(auth owner tpm2_evictcontrol -c /tmp/ctx | \
188 grep ’^persistent-handle: ’ | awk ’{print $2}’)"
189
190 tpm2_create -C "${persistent_handle}" \
191 --public "${output_stem}-public" \
192 --private "${output_stem}-private" \
193 -g sha256 -L /tmp/policy -i - \
194 <"${keyfile}" >/dev/null
195
196 printf ’Persistent handle: %s\n’ "${persistent_handle}"
197
198 tpm2_load -C "${persistent_handle}" \
199 --public "${output_stem}-public" \
200 --private "${output_stem}-private" \
201 -c /tmp/load-ctx >/dev/null
202
203 tpm2_unseal -c /tmp/load-ctx -p "pcr:${hashalg}:${pcr}" >/tmp/unseal
204
205 if ! diff "${keyfile}" /tmp/unseal >/dev/null 2>&1; then




210 echo ’Unsealed data matches sealed data.’
211
212 printf ’Extending PCR %d.\n’ "${pcr}"
213 # It doesn’t matter what it’s extended to, only that it can’t get back.







221 check_installed "tpm2_create" "tpm2-tools" || exit 1
222 check_tpm2_tools_version ’4.2’ || \
223 echo >&2 ’Warning: tpm2-tools version < 4.2, commands may fail.’
224











2 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3
4 set -eu





10 local end=$(( $# - 1 ))
11
12 mkdir -p "${realdst}"







20 mount -t tmpfs none "${tmpdir}"
21
22 tmpdir_mount -o bind,rw "${outputdir}" /output
23 tmpdir_mount -t tmpfs none /tmp
24 tmpdir_mount -t proc proc /proc
25 tmpdir_mount -t sysfs sys /sys
26 tmpdir_mount --rbind /dev /dev
27
28 for dir in /bin /etc /home /lib /lib32 /lib64 /opt /root \
29 /run /sbin /usr /var; do










1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2
3 server-cflags += -O2 -std=c11 -march=native -g -fPIE -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
4 server-cflags += -pipe -fstack-protector-strong -fno-strict-aliasing
5 server-cflags += -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -D_GNU_SOURCE
6 server-cflags += -I $(srctree)/include/progger-host
130
7
8 server-cflags += -Werror -Wall -Wextra -Wstack-protector -Wformat=2 -Wshadow
9 server-cflags += -Wundef -Wcast-qual -Wcast-align -Wlogical-op -Winit-self
10 server-cflags += -Wstrict-overflow=5 -Wredundant-decls -Wnull-dereference
11 server-cflags += -Wshift-overflow=2 -Wduplicated-cond -Wjump-misses-init
12 server-cflags += -Wstrict-prototypes -Wwrite-strings
13
14 server-cflags += $(shell pkg-config --cflags libsodium)
15 server-cflags += $(shell pkg-config --cflags json-c)
16
17 HOSTLDLIBS_server += $(shell pkg-config --libs libsodium)
18 HOSTLDLIBS_server += $(shell pkg-config --libs json-c)
19
20 HOSTLDLIBS_server += -Wl,-z,relro,-z,now -pie
21
22 hostprogs += server
23
24 server-objs += server.o
25 server-objs += crypto.o
26 server-objs += syscall-table.o
27
28 always-y += $(hostprogs)
29
30 $(foreach obj,$(server-objs),$(eval HOSTCFLAGS_$(obj) := $(server-cflags)))
A.26 drivers/net/progger/server/crypto.c















16 #define NONCE_SIZE 24
17 #define KEY_SIZE 32
18 #define AUTHTAG_SIZE 16
19
20 struct record *decrypt(void *data, size_t datalen, void *ad, size_t adlen,




25 struct record *record;
26 unsigned long long record_len;
27
28 nonce = (uint8_t *)data;
29
30 /* TODO: Could be less if we subtract the nonce and auth tag. */
131
31 record = malloc(datalen);
32





38 err = crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt(
39 (void *)record, &record_len, NULL,
40 data + NONCE_SIZE,




45 if (err) {















8 struct record *decrypt(void *data, size_t datalen, void *ad, size_t adlen,
9 const unsigned char *key);
10
11 #endif /* PROGGER_SERVER_CRYPTO_H */
A.28 drivers/net/progger/server/server.c




























28 #define str(s) #s




33 #define xstr(s) xstr_check_arg_defined(s)
34
35 static unsigned char crypto_key[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE];
36
37 /*
38 * TODO: Close the listenfds.
39 */






46 static void init_signal_handlers(void)
47 {
48 struct sigaction action_exit_cleanly = {
49 .sa_handler = exit_cleanly,
50 };
51






58 static const char *addrinfo_ip(const struct addrinfo *addr)
59 {
60 const void *src;




65 if (addr->ai_family == AF_INET)
66 src = &((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)->sin_addr;
67 else if (addr->ai_family == AF_INET6)











78 static int bind_and_listen(struct addrinfo *addr, int backlog)
79 {
80 int sock;
81 static const int yes = 1;
82
83 sock = socket(addr->ai_family, addr->ai_socktype, addr->ai_protocol);
84
85 if (sock < 0)
86 return -1;
87
88 if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &yes, sizeof(yes)) != 0)
89 return -1;
90
91 if (bind(sock, addr->ai_addr, addr->ai_addrlen) != 0)
92 return -1;
93







101 * TODO: json_object_*_add can fail, returning != 0.
102 */
103 static void print_as_json(struct record_syscall_x86_64 *data, size_t data_len)
104 {
105 struct json_object *parent;
106 struct json_object *args;
107 struct json_object *strs;
108 size_t remaining_str_len = data_len - sizeof(*data);
109 size_t travelled = 0;
110 const char *tp_src_str;
111





117 if (data->tp_src == TP_SRC_SYS_ENTER)
118 tp_src_str = "sys_enter";
119 else if (data->tp_src == TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT)
120 tp_src_str = "sys_exit";
121 else





127 json_object_object_add(parent, "ts", json_object_new_int64(data->ts));
128 json_object_object_add(parent, "ret", json_object_new_int64(data->ret));
129
130 json_object_object_add(parent, "pid", json_object_new_int(data->pid));
131 json_object_object_add(parent, "uid", json_object_new_int(data->uid));
132 json_object_object_add(parent, "euid", json_object_new_int(data->euid));
133
134 args = json_object_new_array();
135
134




139 json_object_object_add(parent, "args", args);
140
141 strs = json_object_new_array();
142
143 if (remaining_str_len)
144 data->strings[remaining_str_len - 1] = ’\0’;
145
146 while (remaining_str_len != 0) {
147 struct json_object *str;
148
149 str = json_object_new_string(&data->strings[travelled]);
150 json_object_array_add(strs, str);
151
152 travelled += json_object_get_string_len(str) + 1;
153 remaining_str_len = data_len - sizeof(*data) - travelled;
154
155 if (travelled > data_len - sizeof(*data)) {


















174 static struct record_ad ad;
175 struct record *decrypted;
176 struct record *r;
177 uint8_t *buf;
178
179 recvlen = recv(sock, &ad, sizeof(ad), MSG_PEEK | MSG_DONTWAIT);
180
181 if (recvlen < 0)
182 return -errno;
183
184 if (recvlen != sizeof(ad))
185 return 0;
186
187 recvlen = recv(sock, &ad, sizeof(ad), MSG_WAITALL);
188
189 if (recvlen < 0)
190 return -errno;
191









200 recvlen = recv(sock, buf, ad.len, MSG_WAITALL);
201
202 if (recvlen != ad.len)
203 return -EBADMSG;
204
205 if (recvlen < 0)
206 return -errno;
207
208 decrypted = decrypt(buf, recvlen, &ad, sizeof(ad), crypto_key);
209





215 dataleft = recvlen;
216 dataleft -= XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE;
217 dataleft -= CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
218
219 ret = recvlen;
220
221 for (r = decrypted; r && dataleft >= sizeof(*r); r = next_record(r)) {
222 if (r->len > dataleft) {




227 dataleft -= r->len;
228
229 print_as_json((struct record_syscall_x86_64 *)









239 struct connvector {





245 #define CONNVECTOR_MAX_NMEMB (1024 * 1024)
246 #define CONNVECTOR_MIN_NMEMB 8
247
248 static int add_conn(struct connvector *cvec, int fd)
249 {
250 if (cvec->ncons == cvec->nmemb) {
251 size_t nmemb;
252




256 nmemb = cvec->nmemb ? cvec->nmemb * 2 : CONNVECTOR_MIN_NMEMB;
257 cvec->fds = reallocarray(cvec->fds, nmemb, sizeof(*cvec->fds));
258
259 if (!cvec->fds) {
260 cvec->ncons = 0;










271 cvec->fds[cvec->ncons].fd = fd;












284 if (offset >= cvec->ncons || cvec->ncons == 0)
285 return -1;
286
287 if (offset == cvec->ncons)
288 cvec->fds[offset] = (struct pollfd){};
289 else












302 static int listen_on_addr(const char *node)
303 {
304 int err;
305 struct addrinfo *addr;
306 struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
307 struct pollfd *listenfds = NULL;
308 struct connvector cvec = {};
309 const int listen_backlog = 128;
310 size_t n_addrs = 0;
311 size_t i = 0;
312 int ret = -1;
313
314 static const struct addrinfo hints = {
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315 .ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE,
316 .ai_family = AF_UNSPEC,
317 .ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM,
318 .ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP,
319 };
320
321 err = getaddrinfo(node, xstr(PROGGER_SERVER_PORT), &hints, &addrs);
322 if (err) {




327 fprintf(stderr, "Host ’%s’ resolved to: ", node);
328 for (addr = addrs; addr; addr = addr->ai_next) {
329 fprintf(stderr, "%s", addrinfo_ip(addr));
330 if (addr->ai_next)





336 listenfds = calloc(n_addrs, sizeof(*listenfds));
337





343 for (addr = addrs; addr; addr = addr->ai_next, i++) {
344 int fd = bind_and_listen(addr, listen_backlog);
345
346 if (fd < 0)
347 goto fail;
348
349 if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0)
350 goto fail;
351
352 listenfds[i].fd = fd;
353 listenfds[i].events = POLLIN;
354 }
355
356 while (1) {
357 int nev = poll(listenfds, n_addrs, 0);
358





364 for (i = 0; nev > 0 && i < n_addrs; i++, nev--) {
365 int sock;
366
367 if (!(listenfds[i].revents & POLLIN))
368 continue;
369
370 sock = accept(listenfds[i].fd, NULL, NULL);
371
372 /* TODO: Take an action if add_conn fails. */





377 nev = poll(cvec.fds, cvec.ncons, 0);
378






385 * TODO: Connections currently aren’t being removed.
386 */
387 for (i = 0; nev > 0 && i < cvec.ncons; i++, nev--) {
388 /* TODO: Take an action if remove_conn fails. */
389 if (cvec.fds[i].revents & POLLHUP)
390 remove_conn(&cvec, i);
391
392 if (!(cvec.fds[i].revents & POLLIN))
393 continue;
394
395 err = do_recv(cvec.fds[i].fd);
396
397 /* TODO: Handle more errors. */













411 if (err > 0)
412 break;
413










424 ret = 0;
425
426 fail:
427 for (i = 0; i < n_addrs; i++) {




















447 fd = open(filepath, O_RDONLY);





453 ret = read(fd, crypto_key, sizeof(crypto_key));
454





460 if (ret != sizeof(crypto_key)) {
461 fprintf(stderr, "Crypto key: Tried to read %zu bytes, "








470 int main(int argc, char **argv)
471 {




476 if (argc >= 2)
477 addr = argv[1];
478
479 memcpy(crypto_key, progger_crypto_testkey, sizeof(crypto_key));
480
481 if (argc >= 3) {
482 fprintf(stderr, "Loading crypto key from ’%s’.\n", argv[2]);
483 if (load_crypto_key_from_file(argv[2]) != 0) {




















10 * grep -E ’^[0-9]’ arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | \
11 * awk ’{print "\t[" $1 "] = \"" $3 "\","}’
12 */
13 static const char *const syscalls[] = {
14 [0] = "read",
15 [1] = "write",
16 [2] = "open",
17 [3] = "close",
18 [4] = "stat",
19 [5] = "fstat",
20 [6] = "lstat",
21 [7] = "poll",
22 [8] = "lseek",
23 [9] = "mmap",
24 [10] = "mprotect",
25 [11] = "munmap",
26 [12] = "brk",
27 [13] = "rt_sigaction",
28 [14] = "rt_sigprocmask",
29 [15] = "rt_sigreturn",
30 [16] = "ioctl",
31 [17] = "pread64",
32 [18] = "pwrite64",
33 [19] = "readv",
34 [20] = "writev",
35 [21] = "access",
36 [22] = "pipe",
37 [23] = "select",
38 [24] = "sched_yield",
39 [25] = "mremap",
40 [26] = "msync",
41 [27] = "mincore",
42 [28] = "madvise",
43 [29] = "shmget",
44 [30] = "shmat",
45 [31] = "shmctl",
46 [32] = "dup",
47 [33] = "dup2",
48 [34] = "pause",
49 [35] = "nanosleep",
50 [36] = "getitimer",
51 [37] = "alarm",
52 [38] = "setitimer",
53 [39] = "getpid",
54 [40] = "sendfile",
55 [41] = "socket",
56 [42] = "connect",
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57 [43] = "accept",
58 [44] = "sendto",
59 [45] = "recvfrom",
60 [46] = "sendmsg",
61 [47] = "recvmsg",
62 [48] = "shutdown",
63 [49] = "bind",
64 [50] = "listen",
65 [51] = "getsockname",
66 [52] = "getpeername",
67 [53] = "socketpair",
68 [54] = "setsockopt",
69 [55] = "getsockopt",
70 [56] = "clone",
71 [57] = "fork",
72 [58] = "vfork",
73 [59] = "execve",
74 [60] = "exit",
75 [61] = "wait4",
76 [62] = "kill",
77 [63] = "uname",
78 [64] = "semget",
79 [65] = "semop",
80 [66] = "semctl",
81 [67] = "shmdt",
82 [68] = "msgget",
83 [69] = "msgsnd",
84 [70] = "msgrcv",
85 [71] = "msgctl",
86 [72] = "fcntl",
87 [73] = "flock",
88 [74] = "fsync",
89 [75] = "fdatasync",
90 [76] = "truncate",
91 [77] = "ftruncate",
92 [78] = "getdents",
93 [79] = "getcwd",
94 [80] = "chdir",
95 [81] = "fchdir",
96 [82] = "rename",
97 [83] = "mkdir",
98 [84] = "rmdir",
99 [85] = "creat",
100 [86] = "link",
101 [87] = "unlink",
102 [88] = "symlink",
103 [89] = "readlink",
104 [90] = "chmod",
105 [91] = "fchmod",
106 [92] = "chown",
107 [93] = "fchown",
108 [94] = "lchown",
109 [95] = "umask",
110 [96] = "gettimeofday",
111 [97] = "getrlimit",
112 [98] = "getrusage",
113 [99] = "sysinfo",
114 [100] = "times",
115 [101] = "ptrace",
116 [102] = "getuid",
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117 [103] = "syslog",
118 [104] = "getgid",
119 [105] = "setuid",
120 [106] = "setgid",
121 [107] = "geteuid",
122 [108] = "getegid",
123 [109] = "setpgid",
124 [110] = "getppid",
125 [111] = "getpgrp",
126 [112] = "setsid",
127 [113] = "setreuid",
128 [114] = "setregid",
129 [115] = "getgroups",
130 [116] = "setgroups",
131 [117] = "setresuid",
132 [118] = "getresuid",
133 [119] = "setresgid",
134 [120] = "getresgid",
135 [121] = "getpgid",
136 [122] = "setfsuid",
137 [123] = "setfsgid",
138 [124] = "getsid",
139 [125] = "capget",
140 [126] = "capset",
141 [127] = "rt_sigpending",
142 [128] = "rt_sigtimedwait",
143 [129] = "rt_sigqueueinfo",
144 [130] = "rt_sigsuspend",
145 [131] = "sigaltstack",
146 [132] = "utime",
147 [133] = "mknod",
148 [134] = "uselib",
149 [135] = "personality",
150 [136] = "ustat",
151 [137] = "statfs",
152 [138] = "fstatfs",
153 [139] = "sysfs",
154 [140] = "getpriority",
155 [141] = "setpriority",
156 [142] = "sched_setparam",
157 [143] = "sched_getparam",
158 [144] = "sched_setscheduler",
159 [145] = "sched_getscheduler",
160 [146] = "sched_get_priority_max",
161 [147] = "sched_get_priority_min",
162 [148] = "sched_rr_get_interval",
163 [149] = "mlock",
164 [150] = "munlock",
165 [151] = "mlockall",
166 [152] = "munlockall",
167 [153] = "vhangup",
168 [154] = "modify_ldt",
169 [155] = "pivot_root",
170 [156] = "_sysctl",
171 [157] = "prctl",
172 [158] = "arch_prctl",
173 [159] = "adjtimex",
174 [160] = "setrlimit",
175 [161] = "chroot",
176 [162] = "sync",
143
177 [163] = "acct",
178 [164] = "settimeofday",
179 [165] = "mount",
180 [166] = "umount2",
181 [167] = "swapon",
182 [168] = "swapoff",
183 [169] = "reboot",
184 [170] = "sethostname",
185 [171] = "setdomainname",
186 [172] = "iopl",
187 [173] = "ioperm",
188 [174] = "create_module",
189 [175] = "init_module",
190 [176] = "delete_module",
191 [177] = "get_kernel_syms",
192 [178] = "query_module",
193 [179] = "quotactl",
194 [180] = "nfsservctl",
195 [181] = "getpmsg",
196 [182] = "putpmsg",
197 [183] = "afs_syscall",
198 [184] = "tuxcall",
199 [185] = "security",
200 [186] = "gettid",
201 [187] = "readahead",
202 [188] = "setxattr",
203 [189] = "lsetxattr",
204 [190] = "fsetxattr",
205 [191] = "getxattr",
206 [192] = "lgetxattr",
207 [193] = "fgetxattr",
208 [194] = "listxattr",
209 [195] = "llistxattr",
210 [196] = "flistxattr",
211 [197] = "removexattr",
212 [198] = "lremovexattr",
213 [199] = "fremovexattr",
214 [200] = "tkill",
215 [201] = "time",
216 [202] = "futex",
217 [203] = "sched_setaffinity",
218 [204] = "sched_getaffinity",
219 [205] = "set_thread_area",
220 [206] = "io_setup",
221 [207] = "io_destroy",
222 [208] = "io_getevents",
223 [209] = "io_submit",
224 [210] = "io_cancel",
225 [211] = "get_thread_area",
226 [212] = "lookup_dcookie",
227 [213] = "epoll_create",
228 [214] = "epoll_ctl_old",
229 [215] = "epoll_wait_old",
230 [216] = "remap_file_pages",
231 [217] = "getdents64",
232 [218] = "set_tid_address",
233 [219] = "restart_syscall",
234 [220] = "semtimedop",
235 [221] = "fadvise64",
236 [222] = "timer_create",
144
237 [223] = "timer_settime",
238 [224] = "timer_gettime",
239 [225] = "timer_getoverrun",
240 [226] = "timer_delete",
241 [227] = "clock_settime",
242 [228] = "clock_gettime",
243 [229] = "clock_getres",
244 [230] = "clock_nanosleep",
245 [231] = "exit_group",
246 [232] = "epoll_wait",
247 [233] = "epoll_ctl",
248 [234] = "tgkill",
249 [235] = "utimes",
250 [236] = "vserver",
251 [237] = "mbind",
252 [238] = "set_mempolicy",
253 [239] = "get_mempolicy",
254 [240] = "mq_open",
255 [241] = "mq_unlink",
256 [242] = "mq_timedsend",
257 [243] = "mq_timedreceive",
258 [244] = "mq_notify",
259 [245] = "mq_getsetattr",
260 [246] = "kexec_load",
261 [247] = "waitid",
262 [248] = "add_key",
263 [249] = "request_key",
264 [250] = "keyctl",
265 [251] = "ioprio_set",
266 [252] = "ioprio_get",
267 [253] = "inotify_init",
268 [254] = "inotify_add_watch",
269 [255] = "inotify_rm_watch",
270 [256] = "migrate_pages",
271 [257] = "openat",
272 [258] = "mkdirat",
273 [259] = "mknodat",
274 [260] = "fchownat",
275 [261] = "futimesat",
276 [262] = "newfstatat",
277 [263] = "unlinkat",
278 [264] = "renameat",
279 [265] = "linkat",
280 [266] = "symlinkat",
281 [267] = "readlinkat",
282 [268] = "fchmodat",
283 [269] = "faccessat",
284 [270] = "pselect6",
285 [271] = "ppoll",
286 [272] = "unshare",
287 [273] = "set_robust_list",
288 [274] = "get_robust_list",
289 [275] = "splice",
290 [276] = "tee",
291 [277] = "sync_file_range",
292 [278] = "vmsplice",
293 [279] = "move_pages",
294 [280] = "utimensat",
295 [281] = "epoll_pwait",
296 [282] = "signalfd",
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297 [283] = "timerfd_create",
298 [284] = "eventfd",
299 [285] = "fallocate",
300 [286] = "timerfd_settime",
301 [287] = "timerfd_gettime",
302 [288] = "accept4",
303 [289] = "signalfd4",
304 [290] = "eventfd2",
305 [291] = "epoll_create1",
306 [292] = "dup3",
307 [293] = "pipe2",
308 [294] = "inotify_init1",
309 [295] = "preadv",
310 [296] = "pwritev",
311 [297] = "rt_tgsigqueueinfo",
312 [298] = "perf_event_open",
313 [299] = "recvmmsg",
314 [300] = "fanotify_init",
315 [301] = "fanotify_mark",
316 [302] = "prlimit64",
317 [303] = "name_to_handle_at",
318 [304] = "open_by_handle_at",
319 [305] = "clock_adjtime",
320 [306] = "syncfs",
321 [307] = "sendmmsg",
322 [308] = "setns",
323 [309] = "getcpu",
324 [310] = "process_vm_readv",
325 [311] = "process_vm_writev",
326 [312] = "kcmp",
327 [313] = "finit_module",
328 [314] = "sched_setattr",
329 [315] = "sched_getattr",
330 [316] = "renameat2",
331 [317] = "seccomp",
332 [318] = "getrandom",
333 [319] = "memfd_create",
334 [320] = "kexec_file_load",
335 [321] = "bpf",
336 [322] = "execveat",
337 [323] = "userfaultfd",
338 [324] = "membarrier",
339 [325] = "mlock2",
340 [326] = "copy_file_range",
341 [327] = "preadv2",
342 [328] = "pwritev2",
343 [329] = "pkey_mprotect",
344 [330] = "pkey_alloc",
345 [331] = "pkey_free",
346 [332] = "statx",
347 [333] = "io_pgetevents",
348 [334] = "rseq",
349 [424] = "pidfd_send_signal",
350 [425] = "io_uring_setup",
351 [426] = "io_uring_enter",
352 [427] = "io_uring_register",
353 [428] = "open_tree",
354 [429] = "move_mount",
355 [430] = "fsopen",
356 [431] = "fsconfig",
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357 [432] = "fsmount",
358 [433] = "fspick",
359 [434] = "pidfd_open",
360 [435] = "clone3",
361 [437] = "openat2",
362 [438] = "pidfd_getfd",
363 [439] = "faccessat2",
364 [512] = "rt_sigaction",
365 [513] = "rt_sigreturn",
366 [514] = "ioctl",
367 [515] = "readv",
368 [516] = "writev",
369 [517] = "recvfrom",
370 [518] = "sendmsg",
371 [519] = "recvmsg",
372 [520] = "execve",
373 [521] = "ptrace",
374 [522] = "rt_sigpending",
375 [523] = "rt_sigtimedwait",
376 [524] = "rt_sigqueueinfo",
377 [525] = "sigaltstack",
378 [526] = "timer_create",
379 [527] = "mq_notify",
380 [528] = "kexec_load",
381 [529] = "waitid",
382 [530] = "set_robust_list",
383 [531] = "get_robust_list",
384 [532] = "vmsplice",
385 [533] = "move_pages",
386 [534] = "preadv",
387 [535] = "pwritev",
388 [536] = "rt_tgsigqueueinfo",
389 [537] = "recvmmsg",
390 [538] = "sendmmsg",
391 [539] = "process_vm_readv",
392 [540] = "process_vm_writev",
393 [541] = "setsockopt",
394 [542] = "getsockopt",
395 [543] = "io_setup",
396 [544] = "io_submit",
397 [545] = "execveat",
398 [546] = "preadv2",
399 [547] = "pwritev2",
400 };
401
402 const char *syscall_str_from_nr(uint32_t nr)
403 {














8 const char *syscall_str_from_nr(uint32_t nr);
9
10 #endif /* PROGGER_SERVER_SYSCALLS_H */
A.31 include/progger/compiler.h







8 #else /* __KERNEL__ */
9
10 #ifndef ARRAY_SIZE
















27 #define __unused __attribute__((unused))
28 #endif
29
30 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
31
32 #endif /* PROGGER_COMMON_COMPILER_H */
A.32 include/progger/crypto.h









9 #define CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE 32
10 #define XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE 24
11 #define CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE 16




16 static const uint8_t progger_crypto_testkey[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE] = {
17 0xca, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x37,
18 0xca, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x37,
19 0xca, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x37,
20 0xca, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x37,
21 0xca, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x37,
22 0xca, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x37,
23 0xca, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x37,
24 0xca, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x37,
25 };
26
27 #endif /* PROGGER_COMMON_CRYPTO_H */
A.33 include/progger/net.h





6 #define PROGGER_SERVER_PORT 13753
7
8 #endif /* PROGGER_COMMON_NET_H */
A.34 include/progger/record.h











12 #define assert_field_size(type, field, size) \
13 static_assert(sizeof_field(type, field) == size)
14 #else
15 #define assert_field_size(type, field, size)
16 #endif
17
18 #define SYSCALL_MAX_ARGS_X86_64 6
19
20 #define MAX_RECORD_STR_SIZE 4096




23 #define TP_SRC_SYS_ENTER (1 << 1)
24 #define TP_SRC_SYS_EXIT (1 << 2)
25
26 #define PROGGER_RECORD_PADDING_ALIGN 32
27

























53 assert_field_size(struct record_syscall_x86_64, pid, sizeof(pid_t));
54 assert_field_size(struct record_syscall_x86_64, uid, sizeof(uid_t));
55 assert_field_size(struct record_syscall_x86_64, euid, sizeof(uid_t));
56
57 enum {
58 RECORD_ENUM_MIN = 1024,
59 RECORD_SYSCALL_X86_64 = 1025,
60 RECORD_ENUM_MAX = 65535
61 };
62
63 static inline struct record *next_record(struct record *record)
64 {
65 struct record *next = (struct record *)(((char *)record) + record->len);
66






73 #endif /* PROGGER_COMMON_RECORD_H */
A.35 include/progger/types.h
















16 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
17
















14 new_sid = setsid();




19 printf(" New session ID: %d.\n", new_sid);
20
21 new_pid = fork();
22 if (new_pid < 0) {
23 perror("fork");
24 exit(1);
25 } else if (new_pid > 0) {





31 int main(int argc, char **argv)
32 {
33 if (geteuid() != 0) {




38 printf("Orig. session ID: %d.\n", getsid(0));






44 if (argc < 2)
45 return 0;
46
47 printf("execvp(\"%s\", [", argv[1]);
48 for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++)
49 printf("\"%s\", ", argv[i]);
50 printf("\b\b])\n");
51
52 execvp(argv[1], &argv[1]);
53 perror("execvp");
54
55 return 1;
56 }
